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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Participation in the Hampden District
Regional Skills Center Training Program on CETA
Participants Extrication from Poverty
(September 1982)
Raymond Anthony Jarvis, B.S., American International College
M.Ed., American International College
Ed.D.
,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Directed by: Professor Kenneth Ertel
An extensive review of manpower literature demonstrated a clear
need for research on the long term economic impact of manpower train-
ing programs. The literature review revealed a central issue:
manpower training participant earnings were relatively better after
program completion than before; however, the participant earnings
usually hovered in and around the poverty level.
The literature indicated that the Department of Labor (DOL)
operational philosophy of "entry" level training may be responsible
for the economic impact of training programs leaving the participant
in and around the poverty earning level.
The Hampden District Regional Skills Center in Springfield,
Massachusetts, has developed a training institution with clustered
skills training, i.e., several occupational areas provide the
v
participant an opportunity to exit training at his or her highest
possible skill level — entry, intermediate or advanced.
The contrast between DOL philosophy of "entry" level training
and Hampden County cluster training provided a central focus for
this research: Could the Hampden County training design provide its
participants with requisite skills so that he may earn sufficient
wages to extricate himself from poverty?
The central focus generated several related research questions:
(1) Have the 18-month earnings of each CETA Hampden County training
participant exceeded the corresponding 18-month U.S. Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) poverty level?, (2) Have the 18-month
earnings of the average CETA Hampden County training participant
exceeded the corresponding 18-month 0MB poverty level?, (3) Are
there Hampden County occupational training programs that have resulted
in average 18-month earnings above/below the 18-month 0MB poverty
level for the average Hampden County training participant?, and
(4) What were the 18-month earnings by age, sex, race, and education?
Raw data files from the Hampden County Employment and Training
Consortium (HCETC) 18-month CETA participant follow-up study were
analyzed to provide answers to the postulated questions. Findings
were presented so that each question is answered in its postulated
order.
Data answering question one demonstrate that two-thirds of the
CETA participants extricated themselves from the corresponding 0MB
poverty level; data answering question two state the "average" CETA
vi
participant extricated himself from the corresponding 0MB poverty
level; and data answering question three show eight of nine occupa-
tional programs extricated the participants from the corresponding
0MB poverty level. Data answering question four demonstrated that
the younger participant, 18-21 age category, had the highest average
18-month earnings and highest percentage of individual cases exceed-
ing the corresponding 0MB poverty earnings level within the age
category; that the average male 18-month earnings nearly doubled the
average female 18-month earnings; that the Black category had the
highest average 18-month earnings and the highest percentage of
individual cases exceeding the corresponding 0MB poverty earnings
level within the race category, but that the white male had the
highest average 18-month earnings and percentage of individual cases
exceeding the corresponding 0MB poverty earnings level within the
race/sex category; and that the 13+ years of education category had
the highest 18-month earnings and the highest percentage of individual
cases exceeding the 0MB poverty earnings level within the education
category.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
The past two decades have witnessed the evolvement of a multi -
billion dollar manpower delivery system. This system is somewhat
quasi-educational in that its major goal is the placement of trained
disadvantaged people into the workforce. It could have been, and
perhaps should have been, principally, a vocational educational de-
livery system training people for jobs. Instead, the manpower system
competes with education for the federal dollar and utilizes a vast
majority of its funds on income maintenance programs, such as, work
experience and public service jobs, rather than on vocational educa-
tion programs, i.e., vocational programs that impart specific occupa-
tional competencies.
The manpower system, in its attempt to put the unemployed and/or
disadvantaged person to work, has developed program designs that are
basically educational. The overall delivery mechanism includes out-
reach, assessment, orientation, employability development plan (EDP),
classroom training, on-the-job training, work experience, public
service employment, summer youth employment, job placement, supportive
services, and stipends. The educator may not recognize some of the
elements of the manpower delivery system that are basically indigenous
1
2to the manpower system; yet, much of the system is educational in
nature. For instance, the EDP is simply an individualized training
plan, similar to the concept of specialized educational plans or
contracts. Classroom training provides remedial education in
reading, writing, and computing competencies, and the classroom
training component also provides for General Education Diploma (GED)
preparation and for vocational skills training.
Billions Expended by
Manpower Programs
Fifty-eight billion dollars have been expended by manpower
programs in some two decades, and during that time, several billion
dollars have been spent by manpower training programs. The sheer
magnitude of these expenditures mandates investigation as to their
viability. Government resources are not unlimited; in fact, the
framers of each fiscal year budget must choose from a plethora of
competing demands for the federal dollar. Consequently, fiscal
responsibility demands information that would shed light on the impact
of the manpower expenditures so that the government may weigh the
results. Government has not only the right to spend the taxpayers'
money on alternative social programs, but the responsibility to do
so should management information demonstrate that the alternative(s)
be more effective and/or more efficient. In fact, other social pro-
grams are not the totality of competition for the federal dollar;
hence, manpower training programs compete with many other demands
for funding, e.g., educational programs.
3Dearth of Comprehensive
Employment and Training"
Act (CETA) Research
Despite the fact that the federal government has spent billions
of dollars on the CETA program, little is known about its effective-
ness, since most of the research focused upon manpower was conducted
during the categorical days (1962-1973) rather than during the CETA
years (1973-present). During the CETA reauthorization process in
1978, it became patently clear that there was a dearth of research and
evaluation information available to Congress regarding CETA manpower
programs. A monograph by the Congressional Budget Office states,
"Evaluations of CETA activities have not been completed because the
program is new and because its administration is decentralized"
(CETA Reauthorization Issues, 1978, p. 13).
Manpower Research has Failed
to Provide Useful Management
Information
Two decades of manpower research has produced little useful
evaluative research information. Perry concludes, after reviewing
some 210 manpower studies: "...this research has not produced a
consensus on how well manpower programs have achieved their stated
objectives, or whether the programs accomplished any worthwhile ob-
jectives at all (Perry, Anderson, Rowan, & Northrup, 1976, p. 138).
There are several underlying causative factors: (1) absence of
viable long-term studies, (2) dearth of post-earnings data, (3) dearth
of analytical studies, (4) absence of viable empirical studies, and
(5) absence of a focus upon the occupational training mix.
4Absence of Viable Long-Term Studies
The reliance on short-term studies by the Department of Labor
is a serious shortcoming of manpower research. Most manpower research
is limited to three-months to one-year studies. This time period is
insufficient to determine whether the program has had a substantial
economic impact upon the participant, especially since the disad-
vantaged population consistently fluctuates from the ranks of the
employed to unemployed to welfare, etc., creating a poverty cycle.
Goldstein (1972, p. 2) comments upon the time problem in this
manner: "Few studies track the participants for more than one year."
Gay and Borus (1980, p. 30), in their CETA study on performance indi-
cators, allude to the problems of long-term studies: "A primary
reason for the lack of impact evaluation has been an inability to
make the necessary investment in time and funds." Somers and Warlick
(1975, p. 2) state, "The lack of conclusive findings has been blamed
on methodological deficiencies of the evaluations. One of the major
criticisms is that the evaluation period is too brief. Most govern-
ment reports extend only six months beyond program termination, and
even some of the most rigorous studies conducted by cost-benefit
analysts are based on a one-year follow-up."
Dearth of Post-Earning Data
Much manpower research failed to study a central factor:
what impact upon earnings did the manpower program have? Perry
(1976, p. 139) states, "In most cases, the studies were little more
than descriptive analyses of program operations and enrollment
5charactersi sti cs
,
with little or no useful information on the post-
training labor market experience of enrol lees.
.
.in short, although
there is a large number of studies available for review, few are
very useful as a reliable base of information from which to draw
firm conclusions regarding the economic impact of manpower programs..."
Dearth of Analytical Studies
It appears that the Department of Labor (DOL) research activi-
ties were focused upon social change rather than scientific insight;
consequently, analytical research suffered. The National Academy of
Science (1975, p. 28) states, "...a sizable body of early R & D efforts,
operating as a part of a deliberate social change thrust, utilized
techniques that could not be equated with any disciplinary method nor
with any identifiable style of interdisciplinary study. Results were
reported descriptively, not analytically, and their validity was not
vigorously tested since scientific insight was not a central purpose."
Absence of Viable Empirical Studies
The predilection of DOL to describe programs rather than focus
upon scientific research has resulted in few empirical studies and
these studies are replete with methodological shortcomings thereby
casting doubt upon the findings. Salient methodological shortcomings
include the following: (a) control group problems, (b) inability
to generalize findings, and (c) inadequate control of extraneous
variables.
6Control Group Problems
. Most manpower studies did not include
control or comparison groups. Perry (1976, p. 36) in his review
of some 210 studies, states, "Slightly less than one of every ten
studies used a control group to compare the post-training experience
of program participants with comparable individuals who did not
receive manpower training services."
Also those studies with control groups had compatibility
problems. Perry (1976, pp. 36-37), in his review of manpower re-
research, arrives at the following conclusion: "In almost every
case in which a control group was used, there was valid reasons to
question the comparability of the controls and treatment group.
The inadequacy of the selection of control groups was serious enough
to cast doubt on the major conclusions of program impact reported in
some studies."
Inability to Generalize Findings
. Often, there has been an
inability to generalize findings principally due to the localized
nature of the samples, i.e., geographical restrictions: findings
might not be applicable to other geographical areas.
Stromsdofer (1968), in his study of the Area Redevelopment Act
(ARA), is quite limited in its finding since the study is localized
in the rural, white Appalachians in West Virginia. Goldstein (1972,
p. 33) refers to the difficulties in generalizing from the West
Virginia population: "The West Virginia participants have been
described as fiercely proud and independent, indicating that the
results may not be fully replicable elsewhere." Goldstein (1972,
7p. 29), referring to the Sewell MDTA, North Carolina study: "...
Sewell's sample is relatively small, drawn entirely from a rural
setting, and almost exclusively black...."
Inadequate Control of Extraneous Variables
. Criticism of man-
power studies leveled by the opponents of manpower programs often
included the charge that inadequate control of independent variables
confounded the results making it nearly impossible to determine
whether the manpower program was responsible for the outcome(s) or
whether it was, in reality, one or several other "uncontrolled"
variables.
Goldstein (1972, p. 33), in his report to Congress, states,
"...omitted variables (creaming in the selection of applicants, ab-
normal placement efforts on behalf of the trainees, and motivation)
are at least partially responsible for the benefits attributed to
training in the earlier studies."
Absence of a Focus Upon the
Occupational Training Mix
As a rule, manpower research focused upon the program rather
than the dynamics of its component parts. The mode of research did
little to alter the focus from the program to its component parts,
i.e., empirical research, demonstration, and case study approaches
did not focus upon components of the program, such as, the impact of
the occupational training mix upon the subsequent earning capacity
of the subjects.
8In summation, the problem is basically that a quasi
-educational
system (CETA) is expending billions of dollars yearly to train parti-
cipants for gainful employment, and this system has failed to provide
viable research information on the economic impact of these programs
that could be utilized by program operators, other researchers, or by
Congress in its budget deliberations. Consequently, there is a clear
mandate for research that will focus upon the economic impact of the
CETA training programs.
Purpose of the Study
The central purpose of this study is to determine the economic
impact that a Hampden County, Massachusetts vocationally oriented
CETA training program has had upon its participants in an 18-month
period. Specifically, this study will attempt to determine whether
the 18-month earnings of Hampden County CETA-trained subjects are
sufficient to extricate the subjects from poverty earnings level as
denoted by the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) guidelines.
The subjects were enrollees of the Hampden District Regional
(HDR) Skills Center, which is administered by a Department of Labor
Prime Sponsor: the Hampden County Employment and Training Consortium
However, the HDR Skills Center has been somewhat of a paradox, since
its programs have been under the influence of the Springfield School
Department since its inception in September, 1970. The HDR Skills
Center is a vocationally-oriented program under the aegis of Spring-
field School Department administration. These educational administra
tors have fostered an educational milieu in a manpower environ.
9The HDR Skills Center has developed an individualized voca-
tional skills cluster approach to training. Essentially, the HDR
Skills Center training participant may enter the program at any time
and proceed through the program at his/her own pace. Each training
program contains exit competencies necessary before the training
participant is considered "job ready" and is permitted to seek em-
ployment. Hence, "job ready" participants have successfully attained
required skill competency of the program.
The HDR Skills Center has designed a clustered skills training
concept in two major areas: Machining and Electronics. Machine
Occupations include, for example, Machine Level I, Machine Level II,
Machine Set-Up, and Tool and Die; while Electronics Occupations in-
clude Electronic Bench Assembly, Test Technician I and II, Computer
Operator, and Computer Programming.
Each cluster contains several occupational programs, and each
program requires different exit competencies resulting in a cluster
that provides several different skill levels including entry, inter-
mediate and advanced skills levels. For instance, Machine Level I
exit competencies are at job "entry" skill level; Machine Level II
exit competencies are intermediate job skill level; and Machine Set-
Up and Tool and Die exit competencies are advanced job skill levels.
Each participant is encouraged to obtain his/her highest skill
level; hence, a training participant could proceed through Machine
Levels I, II and exit training from Machine Set-Up or Tool and Die.
10
Although skills training programs are individualized, listed
below are "average" number of weeks it has taken participants to
complete training; these time factors are utilized in monitoring
participant progress.
Occupational Program
Average Length of
Training Program
in Weeks
Job Skills Levels
Entry, Intermediate
Advanced
Machine I 20 Entry
Machine II 23 Intermediate
Machine Set-Up 25 Advanced
Electronic Bench
Assembly 12 Entry
Test Technician I 16 Intermediate
Test Technician II 20 Advanced
Program Operator 18 Intermedi ate
Computer Programmer 30 Advanced
Sheet Metal 24 Intermediate
Graphics 18 Entry
Food Service 16 Entry
Drafting 28 Intermedi ate
Clerical 14 Entry
Auto Body/Mechanics 16 Entry
It should be noted that some of the advanced skills training programs
are quasi -individual ized
,
i.e., are taught in a class approach but
permit participants the opportunity for the first several weeks to
enter the program. The program is then considered closed for the
balance of the program.
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Occupational programs are subject to change due to labor
market demand. The HDR Skills Center attempts to respond to local
and regional labor market demands resulting in the additions and
deletions of occupational programs at various times.
The HDR Skills Center program also offers individualized aca-
demic remediation in related Math and English, General Education
Diploma preparation, and English as a Second Language.
The HDR Skills Center training participant who exits training
from an "advanced" skills training occupational program has, as a
rule, spent more time in training than the participant who exits from
an entry or intermediate skill level program. For example, a parti-
cipant who exits from Tool and Die may have spent 20 weeks in Machine
Level I, 10 weeks in Machine Level II, and 22 Weeks in Tool and Die-
for a total of 52 weeks while a participant who exits with "entry"
level job skills may have spent 20 weeks in Machine Level I.
Questions to be Answered
Given that the central focus of this study is to determine
whether a Hampden County, Massachusetts, vocationally-oriented CETA
training program has indeed resulted in 18-month earnings sufficient
to extricate the Hampden County training participant from poverty,
the following research questions are postulated:
1. Have the 18-month earnings of each CETA Hampden County
training participant exceeded the corresponding 18-month
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (0MB) poverty level?
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2. Have the 18-month earnings of the average CETA Hampden
County training participant exceeded the corresponding
18-month 0MB poverty level?
3. Are there Hampden County occupational training programs
that have resulted in average 18-month earnings above/
below the 18-month 0MB poverty level for the average
Hampden County training participant?
4. What were the 18-month earnings by age, sex, race, and
education?
Significance of the Study
Data generated by a local study is, as a rule, limited in the
generalization of its findings. This study is not to be considered
an exception to the rule. However, this researcher believes that data
generated by this study may be utilized in the upcoming national
dialogue concerning the reauthorization of the manpower programs under
the current mandate of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act,
1973 (reauthorized in 1978). The data generated concerns a local
manpower delivery system that is under the direct influence of its
local school department. Recognizing the limitation of generalizing
from such a study should not prevent the utilization of information
regarding a program under the influence of vocational educators. It
is hoped that this information may prove helpful in the process of
redirecting manpower to the vocational education system.
13
Since much of manpower research has been limited to a six to
twelve month duration, it is expected that eighteen-month data will
prove helpful to researchers and to manpower administrators.
Definition of Terms
Advanced Level Skills Training : refers to programs that pro-
vide exit skills competencies beyond skills required by first-rung
jobs in a particular occupational area. For instance, in Machine
Occupation, Tool and Die provides extensive machining skills beyond
the entry level of machine operator.
Categorical Programs : refers to a plethora of individual
manpower programs mandated by separate legislation, each with its
own guidelines and eligibility criteria.
CETA: the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973,
amended, 1978. This Act consolidated several categorical manpower
programs into one Act, creating a comprehensive, decentralized man-
power delivery system.
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) : CAMPS was
a planning system designed to coordinate at the local and state
levels the delivery of manpower services during the late 1960's and
early 1970's.
Decategorization : refers to the movement to consolidate the
categorical programs into one comprehensive manpower delivery system.
Decentral ization : refers to the movement to transfer program
planning and administration from the federal government to local
governments
.
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Di sadvantaged
: refers to economically disadvantaged as mea-
sured by the 0MB or by welfare status.
Economic Opportunity Act (EOfll : refers to the EOA 1964 legis-
lation that launched the "War on Poverty." EOA included several
manpower programs in the 1960's and early 1970's.
EVh3ible/El iqibil ity : refers to the economic standing required
to enter CETA programs. Basically, to be eligible for CETA, a parti-
cipant must be in poverty as measured by the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) or a welfare client.
Entry-Level Ski l ls Training : refers to programs that provide
exit competencies requisite to first-rung jobs in a particular occu-
pational area. For instance, in Machine Occupation, Machine Level I
would provide exit competencies requisite to machine operator, the
first-rung job in the machine trade.
Manpower: refers to a delivery system of specialized services,
such as, vocational training, work experience, on-the-job training,
job development, and remediation delivered by the Department of Labor
(DOL) grantees. The term is likely derived from the Manpower Devel-
opment and Training Act, 1962.
Manpower Services : refers to services rendered by the manpower
delivery system, including but not limited to the following: remedial
and vocational education, Engl i sh-as-a-Second Language (ESL), General
Education Diploma (GED), vocational and career counseling, work ex-
perience, and job development and job placement.
MDTA: refers to the legislation entitled the Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act, 1962.
15
OMB: refers to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, an
agency responsible for the official issuance of U.S. poverty guide-
lines.
Poverty Level : refers to the earning level considered poverty
by 0MB. This level varies contingent upon family size and geograph-
ical area.
Delimitation of the Study
The sample population for this study was drawn from residents
of Hampden County, Massachusetts, and, therefore, is local in origin.
The uniqueness of Hampden County residents, labor market, and its
vocationally-oriented delivery system may render an attempt to gen-
eralize the results of this research beyond Hampden County invalid.
This is an 18-month descriptive study and is therefore subject
to the methodological limitations of its genre. There may be several
variables impacting participant earnings other than training. A
descriptive study does not attempt to isolate or to weigh all factors;
hence, the reader should be aware of this limitation.
chapter II
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE
Historical Background
Introduction
Billions of dollars have been expended upon manpower programs
in a bit over two decades. A review of the Manpower Report to the
President (latter entitled Employment and Training Report to the
President), Appendix, Section F, reveals that some $46 billion was
spent from Fiscal Year 1963 to 1979, and it is estimated that some
$12 billion have been spent in Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 for a total
of some $58 billion in a little over two decades.
Manpower programs, especially the training components, are
basically educational in nature and, therefore, a prime candidate
for educational research. Actually, the educational community has
to greater and to lesser extent been involved in the delivery of man-
power services to the manpower client over the past two decades; and
the educational community has also been called upon from time to
time to research and to evaluate manpower programs.
Undoubtedly, expenditures of this magnitude warrant an illumi-
nation; a historical review would shed much needed light upon a
quasi-educational delivery system that may continue at a multi-billion
dollar annual appropriation level for some years to come.
16
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The manpower programs discussed in the following pages cannot
be considered the totality of manpower, but a more recent governmental
expression of concern directed at a particular segment of the economy:
the disadvantaged, unemployed person. In fact, educators, economists,
labor officials, as well as others, who consider themselves asso-
ciated with manpower, would undoubtedly disagree upon a definition of
manpower. Roger H. Davidson (1972, p. 1), professor of political
science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, expressed
the dilemma in this manner: "...one of the problems of defining
manpower programs is their ubiquity: immigration, slavery, land
laws, and universal education were all at their heart manpower
policies, and today the most potent manpower decisions are those made
in defense spending, selective service, research and technology, and
a host of other decisions that affect where government's resources are
directed.
"
Hence, educators would consider legislation, such as, the voca-
tional education acts (from the Smith-Hughes Act in 1917 to the pre-
sent Vocational Education Act); the Morrill Act of 1862 (establishing
Land Grant Colleges); and the National Defense Education Act, 1958,
viable manpower programs and justifiably so. Meanwhile, economists
would refer to the programs of the Great Depression (e.g., Work
Progress Administration [WPA], Public Works Administration [PWA],
Civilian Conservation Corps [CCC], and National Youth Administration
[NYA] ) as manpower programs. Labor officials would be sure to in-
clude Employment Security and other governmental programs as manpower
efforts
.
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Much of the confusion and amorphousness focuses upon the lack
of a coherent manpower policy by the federal government. The
National Government has, as a rule, responded to perceived needs and
has not attempted anything like a coordinated national manpower policy.
Hence, manpower programs have been a political response(s) at parti-
cular pressure points in history.
Garth Mangum (1976, p. 41), a luminary in manpower programs, in
discussing manpower policy expressed the paradox of manpower programs
but no manpower policy in this manner "...the policy making of the
1930's appears to have been much more deliberative than that of the
1960's, despite the more emergency nature of the earlier period
There was never a policy agenda .. .just ad hoc response to political
demands and trial and error search for solutions to dimly perceived
problems.
"
The manpower programs that this research will focus upon, then,
are those of the past two decades, and these programs cannot be con-
sidered as manpower but as a component part that has responded to
perceived problems in and by the political arena.
Categorical Programs 1961-1973
Manpower pundits generally point to the modest Area Redevelop-
ment Act (ARA) 1961, as the beginning of categorical programs launched
in the 1 960 ' s by Congress to address, principally, perceived dysfunc-
tions in the labor markets, particularly in the large cities. The
principal focus of ARA was economic development activities ( e
.
g
.
,
construction loans) for economically depressed areas; it also contained
19
a relatively modest manpower training component, which set the stage
for the cornerstone of manpower programs in the 1960's: the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA)
,
1962.
Congress had become concerned with what it then considered high
unemployment (it is interesting to note that the rate was only 6.7
percent) caused, it was believed, by technology. Hence, the original
concern of Congress — the perceived need — was aid to the technologi-
cally unemployed (levitan & Taggert, 1976, p. 17). MDTA was, then,
the second manpower categorical program enacted by Congress in the
1960's at a modest appropriation of some $59.2 million, but was
destined to become the touchstone in manpower training programs in
the 1960's.
MDTA training remained a constant modality throughout the 1960's
while Congress experimented with many categorical programs. However,
the magnitude, when compared to other manpower programs that were
perhaps less viable, remained rather modest. MDTA training started in
1963 at a mere $59 million, increased in 1964 to some $135 million,
1965 through 1971 $200 million and pushing $300 million, and finally
exceeding $300 million in 1973, when MDTA gave way to a decentralized
manpower system. Enrollments from 1964 on ranged from 100,000 to
a 150,000.
It is important to consider the story behind the Department of
Labor as the prime mover of the MDTA legislation; and, consequently,
the major administrative agency for manpower programs that began as
a moderate $59 million program in 1962 to increase in magnitude to
20
over $10 billion in Fiscal Year 1979 rather than where a program of
this nature should perhaps more appropriately be the Department of
Education
.
Unemployment began a steady increase from under five percent
in the mid 1950's to some 6.7 percent in 1961 when MDTA was designed
as an initial response. It is interesting to note, however, that the
concern of Congress was more focused upon a component of the national
unemployment statistics: principally, the white male family heads
with long labor force attachment who were unemployed. Congress feared
that these men were technologically displaced and the growing concern
was that the technological revolution would begin to displace great
numbers of middle class America.
Garth Magnum (1976, pp. 40-41) stated the problem in this
manner: "The unemployed whom the legislators knew best in 1961 were
white male family heads of long labor force attachment. Witnesses
as prestigious as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board... had
testified before Congressional committees that there was no lack of
jobs.... The problem was one of square pegs and round holes
Apparently, those whose substantial skills had suffered technological
obsolescence now needed retraining. "
Having had its consciousness heightened. Congress initially
turned to the Office of Education, but "found no response." "The
Department of Labor, on the other hand, responded with enthusiasm,
derived its own bill and won Presidential approval of it" (Mangum
& Walsh, 1973, p. 8). It has been suggested by manpower professionals
that the initial disinterest by the Office of Education was perhaps
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due to the vocational nature of the proposed course of action, i.e.,
retraining adults. It has been suggested that the United States
Office of Education was principally academically oriented and looked
upon vocational education with a touch of disdain. On the other hand,
Department of Labor officials believed that education was not attuned
to the skill needs of industry and would not provide adequate, timely
skills training and therefore pushed for the total exclusion of the
educator from the inchoate manpower delivery system.
There were proponents in Congress who, despite the disinterest
of USOE, believed that manpower retraining should be administered by
education, not labor, and therefore, "...intense lobbying by the
National Education Association and the American Vocational Association
saved for the Secretary of HEW responsibility for the training
aspects of the Act, including designation of training agents" (Mangum
& Walsh, 1973, p. 49). Hence, "Education associations saved a role
for USOE, but the early disinterest left it no more than a junior
partnership" (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, p. 8).
Consequently, education never recovered from the miscue of its
early disinterest, although there were attempts by educators to gain
control of manpower training during the 1960's. All attempts fell
short; in fact, the Department of Labor consolidated its control over
all manpower programs, even those administered by the Office of
Economic Opportunity (later the Community Services Administration)
during the late 1960's. Thus, today, a multi bill ion dollar manpower
delivery system is in actuality a competing quasi -educational system.
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It is crucial that an understanding be had of the magnitude
of import of the victory by the Department of Labor: a manpower
system evolved over the past two decades under the aegis of the
Department of Labor, thereby reflecting the philosophies of the
Department of Labor rather than the Office of Education, Bureau of
Vocational Education. The most salient destructive result has been
the predilection of the Department of Labor to promote short duration
skills development in low skill, high turnover jobs in order to
process the unemployment quickly and at low cost into the ranks of
the employed, and the predilection of the Department of Labor to
concentrate upon work experience, rather than skills training (vo-
cational education) as the principal manpower modality for the youth
of our nation.
MDTA launched what was soon to be in the 1960's a plethora of
categorical programs by Congress. Each program was spawned by Con-
gress to ameliorate, rather than eliminate, perceived problems. These
programs include MDTA, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream,
New Careers, Special Impact, Concentrated Employment Program, Job
Opportunities in the Business Sector, Work Incentive Program, and
Job Corps.
A brief review of the salient features of the categorical pro-
grams
,
including identification of initial funding agencies, follows.
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA)
.
The Manpower
Development and Training Act was initially conceived by Congress as
a palliative to the perceived problem of technology causing unem-
ployment of the voting middle class. Congress soon realized, however.
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that the great technological displacement effect had not materialized.
Garth L. Mangum (1976, p. 43) states the realization in this manner:
"Designed in 1961 and passed in March 1962, the Manpower Development
and Training Act (MDTA) was not funded until the Autumn and the first
enrollments were during the Winter of 1962-1963. But by Spring of
1963, unemployment of married men which had been 4.6 percent in 1961
was declining rapidly, reaching 3 percent by Summer."
However, the needs of the poor were entering the Congressional
awareness during the early 1 960 1 s ; consequently, it was only natural
that Congress would turn to this new manpower mechanism to serve the
disenfranchised. While MDTA underwent a metamorphosis from serving
the white male head of household to that of serving minorities, youth,
aged, and, most importantly, the disadvantaged. Congress and the
President declared "war on poverty" in 1964, spawning many diverse
manpower programs administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity
under the aegis of the Economic Opportunity Act, 1964. These programs
were focused completely upon the poor.
MDTA was slowly converted to the cause of serving the poor,
principally because initial mandates appear to die, slowly. In fact,
the only negative charge leveled against MDTA in its ten year history
was that it had a proclivity to cream — enroll the least disadvantaged
manpower participant. In retrospect, the statistics tend to bear out
the charge that MDTA did not serve the severely disadvantaged as
measured by race, income, and educational levels. However,
the
statistics also bear witness to an ever increasing service
level to
the disadvantaged from 1964 through 1974 (Perry et al .
,
1976).
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Program operators, despi te continuous amendments and Department of
Labor guideline changes redirecting the program to the disadvantaged,
believed that middle class Americans who were technologically unem-
ployed deserved an opportunity for retraining. Nonetheless, most
manpower experts agree that MDTA did change its priorities and did,
in fact, serve well the disadvantaged. Stanley H. Ruttenberg,
Manpower Administrator, U.S. Department of Labor, mid 1960's, paid
tribute to MDTA in this manner: "Far from being a static, self-
perpetuating design dealing with the problems at the wrong time,
the MDTA, with its amendments, became a dynamic program meeting new
and more pressing national problems as they arose" (Ruttenberg &
Gutchess, 1970, p. 13).
The administration of MDTA was shared by the Department of
Labor and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Office
of Education). The Department of Labor was responsible for identify-
ing labor market needs and for paying stipends to participants while
the Office of Education was responsible for identifying the training
institution responsible for participant training to meet the Depart-
ment of Labor-identified labor market needs, e.g., the Department
of Labor identified a clerical demand. Office of Education identified
a vocational school to provide clerical training.
The administration was a federal, state and local mechanism,
whereby the local Division of Employment Security office would iden-
tify labor market needs, the State Departments of Education (Voca-
tional Education) would identify the service deliverer. The training
project would proceed from the State Department of Education to a
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Regional Review Team of Federal Representatives from the Department
of Labor and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, then,
in many cases, to a Washington Review Team before a project was
finally approved for implementation.
MDTA training began as a project modality, i.e., the Division
of Employment Security would identify a labor market need, and a
State Department of Education would contact for training. There
were several shortcomings in a delivery mechanism that provided
training in one course at a time. The most important being a con-
straint upon the manpower participant: either accept training in
the area offered or receive no help. Another was the traditional
class approach, or a closed course offering, i.e., a fixed beginning
and ending date. This resulted in underutilization of resources due
to high initial dropout rates, i.e., once the program started, no
more participants could enter due to the class teaching pace. Ac-
tually, many of the shortcomings were associated with the rigidity
of the traditional educational system. Ruttenberg stated the prob-
lems of educational systems dealing with the needs of manpower train-
ing in this manner: "The early difficulties with MDTA institutional
training were directly related to the inflexibility of the school
systems. The schools where MDTA training was to take place were
not near the areas where the would-be trainees lived. Classrooms
were available at inconvenient times equipment and curriculum
for training in occupations certified by the Department of Labor
were not readily available. It was often difficult or impossible
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to hire qualified instructors for short-time training courses..."
(Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970, p. 19).
Mangum stated the problems in this manner: "The MDTA trainees
could not be trained during prime hours because regular students
occupied the shops and classrooms during those periods; curricula
were not designed for an adult clientele, nor were instructors accus-
tomed to dealing with adults" (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, p. 50). Both
Ruttenberg and Mangum were somewhat diplomatic with their assessment
of the problem, for vocational educators, at that time, had little
to no experience dealing with the disadvantaged adult, or child, for
that matter. The result was a traditional approach to a new challenge.
In effect, the Department of Labor was correct in its opinion that
education was ill prepared to deal with the issue of manpower retrain-
ing in general and, more specifically, manpower training for the dis-
advantaged population, such as, minorities, the aged, women, and the
young adult.
However, counter to Department of Labor expectations, the educa-
tional community quickly began to adapt to the new demands of manpower
training. Educators began to pressure for mul ti -occupational projects
and for specialized skills training centers. In fact, as early as
the Autumn of 1963, Dr. Howard A. Mathews, Director of the Division
of Manpower Development and Training USOE issued instructions "...out-
lining the procedures to follow in developing multi-occupational and
training centers" (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, p. 53).
The educational community realized early that a specialized
environment was necessary for the disadvantaged adult and child for
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they usually had poor experiences with the traditional school system
and were often hostile to it. Almost all were failures of the
school system. Hence, the concept of a skills training environ
specially adapted to the needs of the manpower participant evolved:
the MDTA skills training center.
The MDTA skills training centers developed a vocationally
orientated training/educational environ to train the disadvantaged
participant that has stood the test of time by surviving to the
present day skills centers sponsored by the CETA manpower delivery
system, i.e., many of the training modalities survived, as well as
several MDTA skills centers. The MDTA skills center housed several
vocational skill areas; instituted the concepts of open entry, open
exit, (i.e., individualized, competency-based curricula) of remedial
education, of high support counseling, and of health and legal aid;
and developed the concept of individualized employment development
plan (EDP), i.e., a forerunner of special education.
In essence, then, the MDTA skills center became a specialized
manpower delivery system for the disadvantaged. A potential parti-
cipant would be able to walk into a MDTA skills center and expect to
be assessed; to have an EDP developed; to enter training that included
remedial education, vocational training, and counseling; to receive
help to eliminate barriers to employment, such as child care, dental
and medical care; to proceed through the program at his or her own
rate; and, finally, when finished with the program, to receive help
(job development and placement) in seeking employment. The MDTA
skills center evolved into a specialized learning environ for the
di sadvantaged.
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Many manpower experts agreed that skills training under the
aegis of MDTA as typified by the MDTA skills center was and still
is a viable concept, but to a large degree MDTA suffered the pangs
of political conflict: the Department of Labor pursued a course of
consolidation of power during the 1 960
‘ s and early 1970's. The
Department of Labor victory tolled the bell of program modesty and
of survival of a few centers into the CETA 1970' s. The Department
of Labor has preferred short-term, low-cost training to that of
viable vocational education for career preparation; work experience,
on-the-job training and publ ic service employment to that of class-
room training. Consequently, as stated earlier, MDTA remained a
modest training program over the decade of the 1 960 ' s and into the
early 1970' s . Annual enrollments never exceeded 180,000 and annual
obligations never exceeded $360 million. While the Neighborhood
Youth Corp, from Fiscal Year 1966 to Fiscal Year 1970, fluctuated
from $400 million to $500 million for basically work experience
programs.
Nevertheless, MDTA training, in retrospect, appears to have
had the most potential for a manpower educational delivery system,
i.e., vocational training. The potential was hardly realized pri-
marily due to the Department of Labor influence. Manpower was a
Department of Labor show, not Office of Education. Hence, the
Department of Labor demanded, and received, low-cost, short duration,
minimal skills training programs.
Garth Mangum stated the problem in this manner: "To the
Department of Labor administrator, a job has typically been both the
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end and the means in manpower policy..." (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, p. 9).
As difficult as foresight is, the program objective should be an
employability plan for each individual based on remaining work life
and realistic opportunity" (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, p. 127).
It has been estimated that a majority of MDTA training focused
upon several entry-level skill areas that could be taught in a
short time span (ten to thirty weeks): "Seven clusters account for
76 percent of total skills center enrollments; automative mechanics,
automatic repair, welding, production machine operator, office occu-
pations, food services, and health occupations" (Mangum & Walsh, 1973,
P. 61).
Despite MDTA shortcomings, most manpower experts view the MDTA
training program as a successful manpower training modality, perhaps
the most successful: Sar Levitan, a manpower luminary, "...these data
were the basis of evaluations showing that MDTA was having a sub-
stantial impact, improving the employability and earnings of its
clientele" (Levitan & Taggart, 1971, p. 37). "There were nine major
studies of institutional training under the Manpower Development and
Training Act. When these were standardized by the use of the same
projecting and discounting assumptions, the benefits to the partici-
pants were found to exceed costs" (Levitan & Taggart, 1976, pp. 139-
140). Perhaps the most candid assessment of the MDTA program comes
from Garth Mangum: "The fact is that after ten years, there is still
no definite evidence one way or the other about MDTA outcomes."
"The average enrollee. . .has experienced a substantial improvement in
employment and earnings as a result of participation in the program.
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Average earnings remain at poverty levels, post-training employment
remains sporadic, but the improvement over pretraining conditions
is impressive" (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, pp. 47-48).
Before leaving this historical abstract of the Manpower Devel-
opment Training Act, it is worth a brief pause to reconsider the
import of the victory by the Department of Labor over a passive Office
of Education: a separate manpower delivery system has evolved from
an initial $59 million program to a multibillion dollar system; the
modality has favored income maintenance and work experience to that
of vocational skills development; and the educator has been effec-
tively debarred from substantive contributions. Eli Ginzberg,
Chairman of the National Manpower Advisory Committee and the National
Commission for Manpower Policy, lamented this tragedy in the follow-
ing manner: "Congress increased its appropriations over the decade
from about $50 million to $2.5 billion annually for manpower training
and empl oyment
. . .most of the money goes for wages and income main-
tenance and less than half a billion is spent specifically for
programs directed at skills acquisition" (Federal Manpower Policy
In Transition, 1974, p. 76). "The long-term core of MDTA-institutional
training-funded at about $280 million in Fiscal Year 1966 — was
actually lower in Fiscal Year 1971 (about $265 million). In per-
centage terms, the decline was precipitous, from 45 to 18 percent
of the total training obligations of the Department of Labor"
(Federal Manpower Policy in Transition, 1974, p. 68).
Finally, the loss appears to be even greater than that men-
tioned above, since it appears that decategorization has diminished
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further the role of education and few of the approximately one
hundred skills centers have survived into the late 1970's and early
1980's.
It has been said by many manpower pundits that MDTA was the
cornerstone of the manpower delivery system in the 1 960
' s ; however,
the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) in 1964 was an
incursion into the field of manpower services by the "war on poverty"
resulting in a proliferation of directionless, competing categorical
programs. In fact, these programs combined to dwarf the MDTA effort.
EOA spawned Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), New Careers, Operation
Mainstream, Special Impact, and Job Corps.
It would serve well to review these programs as a group, since
the initial funding and administrative agency was the Office of Econ-
omic Opportunity (0E0) (later the Community Services Agency). Admin-
istration of these programs by 0E0 differed from the centralized
federal/state/local system utilized by DOL : 0E0 directly funded
local Community Action Programs (CAP). Hence, much autonomy and
authority was granted to these local CAP agencies by 0E0. The
Economic Opportunity Act funded the establishment of almost 1,000
local community action agencies in urban neighborhoods (Levitan, 1969).
Manpower programs were initially secondary to the modality of
giving the poor a voice in eradicating poverty; hence, initially,
legal services, education (adult. Head Start, and Upward Bound),
neighborhood health centers, as well as others endeavors, were
funded by 0E0 to stamp out poverty on the front lines by the people
who were the front line (Levitan, 1969).
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There were proponents on the Sargeant Shriver Task Force,
which was instrumental in promulgating the Economic Opportunity Act,
for battel ing poverty through employment programs rather than the
self-help modality. However, as Ruttenberg states the case: "...
community action, a newly developed concept on which the government
subsidized the organization of the poor as a political and social
force for self improvement .. .offered such a promising route out of
poverty for ghetto residents and the isolated poor that it should
be given top priority rather than employment" (Ruttenberg & Gutchess,
1970, pp. 23-24).
The Office of Economic Opportunity mandated that the governing
boards have a majority representation of client groups, the concept
being that the poor must be in a position of power in order to change
their lot. Ironically, as more and more dollars were allocated to the
manpower programs of the CAP agencies, Congress began to have less and
less confidence in the CAA's as the proper vehicle for manpower
delivery, i.e., charges of mismanagement, abuse, and fraud were
being leveled at the management of the Community Action Agencies (CAA).
The loss of faith in the CAA's by Congress left the door open
for the Department of Labor to annex these manpower programs to its
administrative authority. Ruttenberg states the case in this
manner: "...E0A...in 1966. . .brought the total number of federal
manpower programs aimed at the disadvantaged to seven... the case for
coordination was self-evident. A policy decision was made to put
the responsibility for administering all of the programs in one place
-
the Manpower Administration" (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970, p. 29).
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In short, the Department of Labor moved to consolidate its
power over all manpower programs, since the Department believed that
the Community Action Programs were poorly managed while education
was not in tune with manpower needs. Hence, by the late 1960's, the
Department of Labor had effectively moved all manpower programs within
its control. This is no mean feat, since the 0E0 manpower programs
were at nearly a billion dollar level by 1969 (Ruttenberg & Gutchess,
1970). Compare that level of funding responsibility with the Depart-
ment of Labor MDTA program that was at a $200 million level, and the
magnitude of the coup becomes obvious.
A brief abstract of these original Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (0E0) programs follows.
Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC)
. NYC basically served as an
income transfer system for the poor youth of America, and its prin-
cipal focus was work experience. NYC was divided into three component
parts: In-School, Out-of-School, and Summer. The central goal of
the In-School and Summer School Program was to keep the NYC partici-
pant in school, i.e., to prevent the poor youth from dropping out
of school; while the principal goal of the Out-of-School program
was to provide a holding pattern, "aging vat" for these poor youth
until they were older and thereby were accpetable to the unsubsidized
job market.
Sar Levitan refers to NYC as the "...largest job creation effort
during the 1960's..." (Levitan, 1969, p. 110). And the statistics
certainly bear witness to the claim. Perry states: "From the time
of its establishment through the 1972 fiscal year, 4,321,700 youth
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from low income families enrolled in NYC" (Perry et al
. , 1976, p. 424).
Perry demonstrates the financial commitment of the federal government
to these income transfer programs with an excellent comparison of
MDTA (skills training programs) with NYC (as well as other 0E0 pro-
grams). A review of the table reveals that, after two years, NYC
eclipsed MDTA in funding levels by a hundred million or better from
fiscal year 1967 through 1972 (Perry et al
. ,
1976).
The crucial point to the statistics to recall is that over the
years the NYC income maintenance programs have cost the American
public over a billion dollars more than the skills training programs.
Perry comments on the paradox of greater financial commitment to
income transfer rather than vocational training in this manner:
"...manpower policy during the 1960's was heavily oriented toward
the disadvantaged youth and was tilted toward income maintenance and
supportive services rather than skills training.
. . .
from the review
of program enrollment patterns, however, it is clear that most program
participants were not engaged in a training experience designed to
maximize their individual productivity through the acquisition and
development of job skills" (Perry et al
. ,
1976, p. 20). Perry's
further comments on this paradox: "The impact of manpower programs
has been most pronounced in those programs which have focused on
skills training and job development, and it has been least significant
in those programs which have been confined to pre-vocational training
or work experience — the very programs which have served the highest
concentration of youth, minorities and women" (Perry et al .
,
1976
,
p. 141).
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NYC has often been justified on the grounds that in the final
analysis it has at least provided a palatable income transfer mech-
anism whereby the youth provided a day's work for the income re-
ceived and that busy hands left little time for trouble. Most
manpower experts, however, believe that barring the positive nature
of income transfer, the NYC program was of little success in general
and did little to achieve its stated objectives: "...some findings
indicate that the participants in the In-School and Summer programs
did not lower high school drop out rates" (Levitan, 1969, p. 110).
"The GAO found that there were no significant efforts made by project
sponsors to select youth who were potential drop outs and who were
likely to be dissuaded from this course by what the NYC programs had
to offer" (Perry et al
. , 1976, p. 444). "...Robin concluded that
'...NYC participation, among both males and females, is unrelated to
delinquency prevention or reduction'" (Perry et al
.
,
1976, p. 448).
New Careers and Public Service Careers . The New Careers
program was initiated by the Economic Opportunity Act in 1966; its
intent was to provide a work experience in restructured jobs in the
public and in the non-profit sector in order to create new parapro-
fessional job openings for the economically disadvantaged populations
New Careers later gave way to Public Service Careers, under the
auspices of the Department of Labor, which continued the initial
thrust of the program, i.e., the creation of paraprofessional careers
such as human services aide, health aide, teacher's aide, legal
aide, etc.
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These programs operated at a moderate funding level; for
example, from Fiscal Year 1967 through Fiscal Year 1974, Public
Service Careers Program was less than $400 million. The modest
commitment to these programs is perhaps the reason for little
evaluative research resulting in little to no comment regarding
the effectiveness of these programs by manpower researchers. For
instance, Jon H. Goldstein (the Staff Study of the "Effectiveness
of Manpower Training Programs: A Review of Research on the Impact
on the Poor," submitted to subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the
Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, November
20, 1972) doesn't even consider the New Careers or Public Service
Career programs. The most that can be said is that these programs
were basically income transfer in nature, and that in all prob-
ability some individuals were given an opportunity to begin careers
in various professions.
Operation Mainstream
. Operation Mainstream was another income
transfer program; this program, however, was primarily targeted at
the poor rural elderly population. Perry describes the program in
this manner: "From its inception in 1967 through fiscal year 1972,
Operation Mainstream was a rather small manpower program designed
to give jobs and work experience to chronically unemployed older
nersons Mainstream was not intended to be a 'training* program,
but rather a vehicle for income transfer through job opportunities
for the elderly" (Perry et al
. ,
1976, p. 15). Operation Mainstream
was a program that enrolled some 180,000 at a cost of less than a
half billion dollars from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1974.
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Special Impact. The intent of Special Impact was to attract
business location and/or expansion into ghetto areas thereby creating
job opportunities for the poor; again, the concept of training the
poor for created jobs was not seriously considered. Levitan and
Taggart (1971, p. 13) describe the failure of this program: "Perhaps
the most dismal failure to date among all the manpower and related
efforts has been the Special Impact Program (SIP)." SIP had a short
life: it was initiated in 1966 under EDA and was phased out in the
1970 s as community development corporations became the more accept-
able modality for attracting businesses to economically depressed
areas. SIP was never more than an experimental modality with a
relatively minor financial commitment by the federal government.
Job Corps . The central purpose and thrust of the early Job
Corps program under the aegis of EOA was to provide an environ for
the poor that would break the poverty cycle. To accomplish this end,
the poor were removed from their neighborhood and transported to
residential centers; in fact, initially, the philosophy was to remove
the youth from their state and often from their region of the country.
It was soon discovered there were many drop outs due to homesickness;
consequently, youth were later enrolled in nearby centers and per-
mitted to go home on furloughs.
Job Corps developed an intensive and extensive assessment and
support system for the participant. The Centers provided assessment,
counseling, academic remediation, and skills training.
Job Corps has been one of the few manpower programs that has
managed to survive from the early 1960's into the 1980's. Its
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survival is due to its ability to create a positive image through
its evaluative literature, i.e., the evaluative research of Job
Corps has had as its objective the placement of Job Corps in its
best light.
Due to the high support and residential nature of Job Corps,
cost per participant has been higher than other manpower programs,
and has often been criticized on this factor, however justified.
The OEA manpower programs discussed in the foregoing pages
were all ultimately annexed by the Department of Labor; and coupled
with MDTA and several other programs under the control of Department
of Labor — Job Opportunity in the Business Sector (JOBS), Work
Incentive Program (WIN), Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), and
the Public Employment Program (PEP) — provided the manpower milieu.
A brief review of the Department of Labor manpower programs follows.
Job Opportunity in the Business Sector (JOBS) . The central
thrust of JOBS was to enlist the support of the business community
in employing and training the poor. The Department of Labor would
reimburse the business for the extraordinary costs attendant to
training the participants usually computed at 50 percent of the
salary of the participant. This, of course, was in effect subsi-
dizing businesses that hired the poor.
Most manpower experts agree that little to no training was
accomplished by this program due to the proclivity of the business
community to hire in low skill positions that require little to no
skills training. In fact, most positions were low skill, high
turnover.
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Perry describes JOBS in this manner: "...the available infor-
mation suggests that the labor market impact of the program was
extensive rather than intensive' in that it served more to expand
the scope of the supply of labor for existing jobs than to foster
new types of training and/or employment opportunities" (Perry et al
.
,
1976, p. 200).
Goldstein (1972, p. 9) noted, "Two studies (GAO, 1971 and
Green leigh Associates, 1970) found that many of the jobs filled
under the program were positions traditionally held by low-skilled
and unskilled persons. Greenleigh concluded that most of the jobs
pledged by employers were concentrated in occupations which his-
torically have had high turnover rates." Sar Levitan, "The unfor-
tunate reality is that the program has not proven its worth
despite its initial unsubstantiated claims of success..." (Levitan
& Taggart, 1971, p. 37).
The amazing fact is that, despite evaluative literature that
suggests little to no viability for JOBS, the Department of Labor
still fosters this program today under the auspices of the National
Alliance of Business, which DOL had created to administer the JOBS
program in the early 1970's.
The Work Incentive Program (WIN) . The acronym for the Work
Incentive Program is WIP, and the program was often perceived as
whipping the welfare recipient into the job market rather than
providing much needed skills training to break the poverty cycle.
The writer still wonders where from came the "N."
The early WIP (WIN) began with a focus upon training, but
later, with Congressional insistence upon workfare rather than
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welfare, WIN has been diluted to an orientation and job referral
modality; little investment is made in training that could provide
necessary skills to break the poverty cycle. WIN was enacted in
1967 as an amendment to the Social Security Act. However, the
program had several forerunners: the 1962 amendment to the Social
Security Act authorizing a program of community work and training
for welfare recipients and the Work Experiences and Training Pro-
gram under Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act (the "Happy
Pappy Program") (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970, pp. 41-44). Congress
was intent upon putting the welfare recipient to work and the
Department of Labor was intent upon administering all manpower
programs. Hence, WIN was placed under the aegis of the Department
of Labor rather than HEW, which had administered the Community Work
and Training Program.
Manpower critics find little viability in the WIN program.
Sar Levitan (1969, pp. 114-115) sums up the program in this manner:
"WIN was less and less a training program and more and more a
delivery agency.... because WIN provides little upgrading of
enrollees, even those who are placed in jobs leave the program
with the same meager skills with which they started." Perry con-
cludes, "...WIN resulted in little or no reduction in welfare
dependency. . .
"
The viability of WIN is doubtful; yet. Congress has invested
some $2 billion dollars from the inception of the program in 1967
to fiscal year 1979. The program has resulted in little training and
little to no reduction in welfare dependency.
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Concentrated Employment Program (CEP)
. The Concentrated
Employment Program (CEP) originated through Department of Labor
administrative action: CEP was initiated by administrative fiat
in early 1967 rather than Congressional enactment. Congress,
however, later incorporated CEP into the Economic Opportunity Act,
whereupon the Department of Labor and the Office of Economic
Opportunity shared administrative responsibility for the program.
CEP was viewed by Department of Labor administrators as an
initial attempt at coordination of manpower programs in targeted
economically depressed areas. Ruttenberg, Manpower Administrator
at that time, describes the purpose of CEP as follows: "The
concept of CEP is that there should be made available to the in-
dividuals who live in a concentrated target area all of the man-
power services that each individual needs in order to bring him
from unemployability to permanent employment in a decent job"
(Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970, p. 22).
Perhaps a major reason for CEP's failure was the manner in
which it was created: the Department of Labor utilized lag funds
from several existing manpower programs. "...Nearly $100 million
allocated to MDTA, NYC, New Careers and Special Impact Programs
was put in one package to be concentrated on target areas in
nineteen large cities and two rural communities" (Levitan & Mangum,
1969, p. 17). Agency rivalry for limited manpower dollars at
the national, state and local level as well as a titanic battle
for federal administrative control of the manpower programs by HEW,
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DOL, and OEO created an environment which made success difficult,
if not impossible.
CEP was to assess, to orientate, and to refer clients to avail-
able manpower resources or to direct employment depending upon
client needs. CEP also saddled itself with a job placement goal
of 50 percent of clients served. In retrospect, considering the
client (poor minority people), the placement rate seems unrealistic.
Nevertheless, most manpower professionals agree that the CEP
was a failure: Levitan, "...the Concentrated Employment Program
has never had a glowing reputation among manpower efforts. At the
outset, many CEP's were plagued by agencies like the Employment
Service..." (Levitan & Taggart, 1976, p. 183). "The goal of placing
half of them with private employers did not materialize. Neverthe-
less, plans were made to expand CEP during subsequent two years
from nineteen cities and two rural areas to an intended goal of
146" (Levitan & Mangum, 1969, p. 17). Perry, "The evaluative studies
were replete with evidence showing the failure of CEP to meet its
placement goals..." (Perry et al., 1978, p. 344). "In summary, the
limited evidence in the evaluative reports dealing with program
component use showed that CEP served more as a dispenser of supple-
mentary job information and an employment referral system than as
a system directed toward upgrading the marketable skills of the
disadvantaged in preparation for better jobs" (Perry et al., 1976,
p. 348). Thus, despite documented evidence of the failure of the
Concentrated Employment Program, the Department of Labor continued
to invest over a billion dollars in CEP from 1967 through 1973.
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Public Employment Program
. The Emergency Employment Act of
1971 marked the return of the federal government to public subsi-
dized jobs on a large scale. The Act's title is symptomatic of the
Congressional mood: something had to be done about what Congress
deemed to be an intolerably high unemployment rate. The conserva-
tives feared a return to the New Deal while the liberals believed
that Congress had a responsibility to the unemployed of the nation,
particularly, the disadvantaged. The Department of Labor did its
best to insist upon service to the disadvantaged, but the munici-
palities seemed to prefer the less disadvantaged.
Levitan (1969, p. Ill) describes the program in this manner:
"Through the 1960's job creation efforts were limited in scope and
target groups. In contrast, the Emergency Employment Act of 1971
funded public employment jobs on a much larger scale as a counter-
cyclical tool to combat high unemployment. The $2.5 million ex-
pended under the Act over a three year period created, at its peak
in 1972, a total of 170,000 jobs."
The importance of the program to the Department of Labor
influence over the manpower delivery system should not be under-
estimated, for in one bold stroke, the Department of Labor nearly
doubled its manpower expenditures. Public employment fit neatly
into DOL philosophy of getting people employed rather than
trai ned.
Eli Ginzberg, Chairman of the National Manpower Advisory
Committee, expressed dismay over the substantial commitment to
public jobs rather than skills training: "The almost exclusive
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concern with training as the core element in manpower programming
has recently been breached. In dollar terms, the 2-year appropria-
tion for EEA is only slightly less than the 10-year expenditures for
MDTA" (Federal Manpower Policy in Transition, 1974, p. 52).
Congress increased its appropriations over the decade from about
$50 million to $2.5 billion annually for manpower training and
employment.... most of the money goes for wages and income main-
tenance and less than half a billion is spent specifically for
programs directed to skills acquisition" (Federal Manpower Policy
in Transition, 1974, p. 76).
In summation, the foregoing review of the manpower environ
produces several salient factors:
The Department of Labor fought successfully to expand
its control over all manpower programs: the losers
were HEW and 0E0;
The national turf battle was reflected in the local
turfdom issues, resulting in competing and con-
flicting categorical programs;
The loss by education has resulted in the dimunition
of vocational training and an emphasis upon income
transfer programs, such as, public service jobs and
work experience. The Department of Labor has also
emphasized referral to jobs and low-cost, minimal-
skill training and placement into unskilled and
low-skill, high-turnover jobs
.
CETA 1973 to Present
The review of the manpower milieu present in the early
1960's and 1970's should demonstrate to the casual reader a need
for consolidation of manpower programs. The manpower luminaries,
admi ni strators (national, state and local), and researchers began
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a dialogue in the mid-sixties that emphasized the need to consoli-
date these competing individual manpower programs into a comprehen-
sive manpower delivery system.
As early as 1965 when the manpower programs began to proli-
ferate, there were proponents for consolidation, particularly within
the Department of Labor, since the Department of Labor sought to
consolidate these programs under its domain. Ruttenberg refers to
the problem of conflicting manpower programs: "...in 1965, when I
became the Manpower Admi nistrator, the Committee turned its attention
to what was becoming a paramount issue — the need for coordination
of manpower efforts, particularly at the local level (Ruttenberg &
Gutchess, 1970, p. 30).
Initial response to the categorical ad hoc approach to manpower
delivery was to attempt coordination of programs that were funded
by several competing departments and agencies. The Department of
Labor led the coordination effort. The need for coordination was
obvious to manpower professionals: competing programs were often
duplicative, overlapping, wasteful, and required the participant to
fit into program requirements rather than provide for the total needs
of the individual.
Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) was actually a program-
matic attempt at coordination of local manpower programs in targeted
areas. CEP, as stated earlier, was initiated by administrative
action by the Department of Labor in early 1967. The concept of one
agency to coordinate the several manpower programs in a targeted
area was commendable. However, the territorial fighting at the
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national level was mirrored at the local level, resulting in a
dismal failure by the CEP's.
Levitan describes the CEP concept and its problems: "In
early 1967, the Concentrated Employment Program was launched with
the dual intent of concentrating limited funds on a few target
areas and creating a single agency to tie together the separate
programs operating in a locality. The local CEP was intended to be
a one-stop center; which could provide some services itself, pur-
chase others, or refer the applicant to other agencies — thus
insuring that each person would receive the package of services he
needed. CEP was unable to meet these objectives. At the outset,
a jurisdictional conflict erupted between local OEO-funded agencies
and the United States Employment Service.
. .CEP program has been a
failure in most areas.... Instead of coordinating existing programs,
it has simply complicated the situation by adding another layer of
administration" (Levitan & Taggart, 1971, p. 65).
Concurrently with the CEP programmatic effort at coordination,
the Department of Labor spearheaded an attempt at coordinating the
planning efforts of the competing manpower agencies at the local,
state, and national levels. The focus of the Cooperative Area
Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) was to coordinate the planning of
all manpower programs in a given area so that duplication, waste,
and territorial fighting would give way to a comprehensive plan in
an area that would make the best use possible of the federal man-
power dollar, no matter what the source. CAMPS was initiated ad-
ministratively in 1967 through a cooperative interagency agreement
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by the Department of Labor, Office of Economic Opportunity, Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, and Departments of Agricul-
ture, Interior, Commerce, and Civil Service.
CAMPS provided a structure of local, state, and regional
planning committees whereby area needs were to be assessed, prior-
ities were to be established, and resources (from differing cate-
gorical programs) were to be applied. However, participation was
voluntary, and there was no legislative mandate (only an interagency
agreement at a national level) to place necessary authority with
the CAMPS; consequently, local program operators went about their
business in the same isolative, conflicting manner. The plans were
usually an academic exercise reflecting a compilation of the indi-
vidual categorical programs rather than a coordi native approach to
effectively utilize available manpower dollars.
Levitan describes the failure of CAMPS: "Cooperative Area
Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) was initiated to increase state
planning and coordination, largely through the Governor's Office....
This is not the way it turned out. Most plans were little more than
the consolidation of the separate local and participating state
reports.... CAMPS had no clout and the manpower 'plans' they spun
were of doubtful value — ignored by those concerned with getting
money and operating programs" (Levitan & Taggart, 1971, p. 66).
While it was immediately obvious that the federal adminis-
tration of local categorical programs suffered from coordination
problems, it became increasingly obvious that the manpower programs
often did not perceive or answer local needs. Consequently,
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observers, practitioners, and administrators began to press for
decentralization as well as decategorization. "Perhaps the most
influential statement of the emerging idea about decentralizing
delivery systems was a seminar paper on the states' manpower role,
prepared for the National Governors Conference in 1968 by University
of Utah manpower expert Garth L. Mangum" (Davidson, 1972, p. 10).
As early as 1968, manpower experts were calling for legisla-
tion that would consolidate the various competing manpower programs
into a single delivery system that would decentralize manpower
decision-making to state and local areas while maintaining an over-
sight role for the federal government, thereby, insuring that national
goals would be instituted in the state and local areas. In effect,
manpower reform was avered.
"The consensus view concerning manpower reform was epitomized
in the report of President-elect Nixon's Task Force on Manpower and
Labor Management Decisions Chairman of group was Shultz, who was
later named as Nixon's first Secretary of Labor." "In its December
1968 report, the Shultz task force identified four key problems in
manpower programs: ...(2) the ad hoc legislative approach had pro-
duced overlapping programs, (3) national programs created by federal
initiative were not flexible enough to meet local situations,..."
(Davidson, 1972, p. 11 )
.
Decentralization of manpower programs was consonant with the
philosophy of the Nixon administration, which was committed to reduce
the federal bureaucracy through a revenue sharing modality. Hence,
the Nixon administration introduced legislation to consolidate and to
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decentralize the plethora of competing manpower programs. Several
other manpower reform measures were submitted to Congress during
closing years of the 1 960 1 s only to result in a Presidential veto of
the Employment and Manpower Act on December 16, 1970. The reason
for the veto was basically a philosophical difference of opinion
between a liberal Congress which included a public service jobs
program in the legislation and a conservative president who opposed
such a program. Congress could not override the Presidential veto,
and consequently, manpower reform had to wait another three years
before reaching fruition.
Consequently, the ineffective attempts at coordination contin-
ued (basically, CEP and CAMPS), and Congress continued to pursue a
course of action that included further attempts at manpower reform
and at the implementation of a subsidized public jobs program.
Congress succeeded in passing the Emergency Employment Act (EEA) in
1971. The magnitude of a $2.5 billion program to the manpower
environ further exacerbated an already overwhelming need for manpower
reform. Having lost the battle against public jobs, the Nixon
administration continued to auger for a consolidated, decentralized
manpower system and, finally, the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act was enacted in December 1973, some five years after
the Task Force on Manpower and Labor Management Decisions proposed
legislative reform.
The Nixon administration considered the Comprehensive Employ-
ment and Training Act (CETA) as its first revenue sharing program.
The intent of the Act was to consolidate all manpower programs and
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decentralize the decision-making to the local level. The Statement
of Purpose of the Act reflects this philosophy: "It is the purpose
of this Act to provide job training and employment opportunities
for the economically disadvantaged, unemployed, and underemployed
persons, and to assure that training and other services lead to
maximum employment opportunities and enhance self-sufficiency by
establishing a flexible and decentralized system of Federal, State,
and local programs" (Harrington & Sum, 1980, p. 11).
Most existing categorical manpower programs in the early
1970's were incorporated into Title I of the CETA Act. MDTA, NYC
(In and Out-of-School programs). Public Service Career Program,
Operation Mainstream, Concentrated Employment Program, and the JOBS
program. However, the Department of Labor managed to fund the JOBS
program, the summer youth program and certain national service de-
liverers of the Operation Mainstream program separate from Title I,
thereby maintaining remnants from the categorical delivery system.
To further muddle the new delivery system, the Department of Labor
protected certain CEP's by granting them prime sponsor status
under CETA. Consequently, a clean, surgical break from the past
categorical programs never truly occurred from the start. This
proclivity to retain a national control of delivery designs, i.e.,
insuring the continuation of national priorities through the
mechanism of direct funding, has resulted in a CETA program that
has, in truth, never been decategorized nor decentralized.
The following is a brief description of the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act, 1973 (CETA):
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Title I Comprehensive Services: Outreach, Assessment,
Orientation, Counseling, Classroom Training, On-the-
Job Training, Work Experience, Job Placement, Sup-
portive Services, Allowances
Administrative Provisions: Planning Councils, Department
of Labor review and approval of plans, judicial review,
and other administrative concerns
Title II: Public Service Employment
Title III: Special Federal Responsibilities
Part A — Special Target Groups
Part B Research Training and Evaluation
Title IV : Job Corps
Title V: National Commission for Manpower Policy
Title VI: General Provisions
The brief abstract above describes the original CETA legislation,
which has been amended on several occasions and reauthorized in 1978.
CETA was amended December 31, 1974, adding a $2.5 billion
Emergency Jobs Program as Title VI and changing Title VI General
Provisions to Title VII. CETA was further amended in 1977 by the
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Acts of 1977 (YEDPA);
YEDPA was incorporated into the existing Title IV. The intent of
this modification of the Act was to provide a greater youth empha-
sis in CETA, which seems to have abated since the dissolution of
the NYC. The 1978 reauthorization emphasized tighter controls;
added a Private Sector Initiative Program (PSIP); and rearranged
Title contents. The following is a brief discriptive abstract
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of the 1978 reauthorized Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA):
TITLE I, Administrative Provisions. Organizational and
general provisions applicable to the entire act; consolidates the
procedures for planning, reporting, auditing, and other administra-
tive requirements; authorized appropriations generally for fiscal
years 1979 through 1982.
TITLE II, Comprehensive Employment and Training Services.
Comprehensive work and training activities contained previously in
Titles I and II. Authorizes institutional and on-the-job training,
work experience, job search assistance, and supportive serivces.
Also contains a separate counter-structural public service employment
program, with new jobholders limited to economically disadvantaged
persons who have been unemployed 15 of the last 20 weeks or who are
receiving or are part of a family receiving welfare benefits.
TITLE III, Special National Programs and Activities. Special
target group programs for Indians and other native Americans, migrant
and seasonal farm-workers
,
ex-offenders, older workers, displaced
homemakers, women, and the handicapped. Welfare reform demonstration
projects included for the first time. Continues programs of research
and development, technical assistance, and labor market information.
TITLE IV, Youth Programs. Provides for Job Corps residential
training program; summer program for disadvantaged youth; and youth
programs first authorized by the Youth Employment and Demonstration
Projects Act of 1977 ( YEDA) except the Young Adult Conservation Corps
(YACC), which continues in Title VIII. New youth programs are
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continued only through fiscal year 1980 because of demonstration
aspects; YACC is authorized through 1982.
TITLE V, National Commission for Employment Policy. Author-
izes an advisory commission with both public and private members to
be appointed by the President.
TITLE VI, Public Service Employment Program. Authorizes PSE
programs at levels adjusted for the national unemployment rate.
New PSE jobholders must be unemployed for 10 of the last 12 weeks
and have family income at or below the BLS lower living standard
budget or received (or be a member of a family receiving) public
assistance 10 of the last 12 weeks.
TITLE VII, Private Sector Initiative Program (PSIP). Two-year
demonstration of alternative approaches to obtaining greater in-
volvement of private sector in employment and training of the dis-
advantaged. Established Private Industry Councils (PIC's) with
representatives from industry, business, organized labor, community-
based organizations, and educational institutions to participate
with prime sponsors in improving access for all CETA participants
to private sector jobs.
TITLE VIII, Young Adult Conservation Corps. Authorizes the
year-round corps open to both disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged
youth, 16 to 23 years old, for conservation work in national parks,
forests, and other public lands.
A brief description of the administrative hierarchy of CETA
beginning from the bottom up would be as follows:
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PRIME SPONSOR: A prime sponsor is a local governmental unit
of 100,000 or more population that is eligible
to receive directly a CETA grant. The prime
sponsor would assess local needs and expend the
grant funds according to the goals and objec-
tives arising from local needs.
BALANCE OF STATE: The State has the responsibility for assessing,
planning and operating the grant funds available
to governmental units of less than 100,000
population.
STATE COUNCIL: The State employment council is responsible
for the review of local prime sponsor plans to
insure coordination, for technical assistance
to prime sponsors, and for research and devel-
opment of projects.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: Federal oversight role, has final APPROVAL over
local plans, provides technical assistance to
states and to prime sponsors, and evaluates
prime sponsor and State grants.
Theoretically, CETA provides funds directly from Congress to
local government (s ) (city of 100,000 or more); these funds are to be
in the form of a grant. The administrative hierarchy of CETA pro-
vides that a prime sponsor receive notification of authorized funds
for its area (allocation formula based upon several factors, the
most important of which are unemployment rate and poverty rate);
that the prime sponsor upon notification plans for the utilization of
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the funds to help meet local needs. (Note that public input into
the planning process is essential and is provided for through the
use of local and State planning councils); that the State review
the plans and provide a statement of concurrence; and that DOL re-
view and approve the plan before funds are released to a locality.
In practice, the approval authority of the Department of
Labor, the strong oversight role demanded by Congress and other
manpower experts, the national priorities (taking precedent over
local priorities), PSE counter cyclical demands, and administrative
abuses have resulted in decentralization in name only . CETA is not
a revenue sharing program; it remains a federally controlled program.
The foregoing description of the administrative hierarchy con-
cludes that realization of a major CETA goal — decentralization of
decision making — is debatable. An evaluation prepared for the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences comments on this paradox: "...the shift
from federal to local control occurred without abdication of federal
oversight responsibilities and the degree of federal presence continues
to be a controversial issue. .. .there are increasing federal constraints
on programs arising out of new legislation and from emphasis on Depart-
ment of Labor accountability that limits local autonomy. Morevoer,
after the Nixon administration there was less of an idealological
commitment to decentralization" (Mirengoff & Rindler, 1978, p. 3).
If true decentralization may not have occurred, what of the
goal: decategorization? Decategorization is also doubtful for several
reasons: Public Service Employment is a categorical program, the
New Youth programs and the Private Sector Initiative Program are
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categorical in nature, and, finally, the proclivity of the Depart-
ment of Labor to fund national programs is categorical. Title II
(originally Title I) programs remain comprehensive, but have de-
clined in their relative importance in dollars expended. In short,
the Department of Labor has contravened the philosophy and intent
of the original CETA legislation. "...CETA has become a hybrid
program; not entirely decentarl ized
,
not completely decategorized"
(Mirengoff & Rindler, 1978, p. 5).
Manpower experts, program operators, and Department of Labor
officials may not agree on whether CETA has accomplished its major
goals of decentralization and decategorization, but all would agree
that the manpower delivery system has been consolidated under a
federal/local program delivery design.
Has the consolidation improved the delivery of manpower ser-
vices by eliminating duplication and by increasing efficiency?
What have been the trends of manpower services delivery under the
auspices of the CETA manpower delivery system? The first question
is unanswerable due to a dearth of research comparing the delivery
system. The dearth is primarily due to the nearly impossible nature
of such a task. There is, however, data available regarding the
trends of the CETA manpower delivery system.
Based upon the demonstrated proclivity of the Department of
Labor to emphasize programs that quickly place people into jobs,
one would expect a continuation of emphasis upon work experience
and upon public jobs: this phenomenon has, in fact, manifested
itself throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's. In short, there
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has been a continued migration from sound, viable skills training
to income transfer programs of work experience and public service
employment. Further experts believe that the service to the dis-
advantaged population has decreased under the CETA delivery system.
Perhaps the greatest blow to the manpower delivery system appears to
be the concentration on low-cost training at the expense of the MDTA
skills centers; in short, few MDTA skills centers have survived the
change in the delivery system.
Mirengoff and Rindler (1978, p. 6), in their report to the
National Academy of Sciences, describe the phenomenon as follows:
There has been, however, a relative movement away from preparation for
economic self-sufficiency toward subsidized jobs. Relative expenditures
for the major Title I development programs, classroom and on-the-job
training, declined between 1974 and 1976, while the proportion of expend-
itures for work experience and other income maintenance proqrams rose."
As the depression persisted, the Title VI public service employment
program grew and soon overshadowed the Title I programs..." (p. 3).
"...the basic employabil i ty development programs of Title I, although
larger than before, were relegated to the back burner" (p. 8).
Mirengoff' s major premise is that substantially greater funds
were allocated to PSE and to work experience programs, thereby fo-
cusing the attention of the new delivery system away from training
and toward income transfer programs. Statistics corroborate that
premise: A compilation from Section F Manpower reports to the
President (Manpower and Employment and Training Reports for fiscal
years 1975-1979) show that public service employment programs
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expended twice as much as the Title I programs: PSE $18 billion
to just under $9 billion for Title I.
Statistics do not clearly demonstrate the decisive move from
training due to the reporting methodology, i.e.. Title I expenditures
of some $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1975 to some $1.9 billion in
fiscal year 1979 do not clearly indicate the magnitude of expendi-
tures of classroom training vs. that of work experience. Further,
the quality of classroom training is suspect; in short, remedial
education, attitudinal training, and referral programs all are
reported under the rubric of classroom training. Hence, the magni-
tude spent for viable skills training is not known; however, man-
power experts are sure that skills training has been diminished
rather than enhanced under CETA, even though Title I (comprehensive
training title, later Title II) programs approached a $2 billion
level by the close of the 1970's.
The Mirengoff and Rindler (1978, p. 10) report to the National
Academy of Sciences noted the trend from skills training in several
different references to the matter: "The program emphasis of Title I
has shifted from activities that enhance human capital to those that
basically provide income maintenance. There are also serious ques-
tions about the quality of skills training and work experience
programs." "Many sponsors moved decisively away from class-sized
projects and skills centers to much wider use of individual refer-
ral..." (p. 128). "There is evidence that some prime sponsors were
adjusting classroom training content to conform to a low-cost
strategy. . .the Department of Labor grant review guidelines for
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fiscal year 1977 seem to favor a relatively low-cost Title I program
strategy and could have the effect of diminishing the educational
content of classroom training 11 (p. 129 ). "The classroom training
category is a mixture of many different kinds of courses; it in-
cludes everything from skills training to general education and
English as a second language, which in themselves do not lend to
immediate job placement" (pp. 228-229).
J. W. Lewis (1975, p. 65), Mississippi State Director of Voca-
tional Education was much less objective and very much impassioned
in his comments regarding the impact upon skills training: "We have
had casualties. We have lost some skills centers and individual
programs
,
and it is inevitable that we will lose a few more. Many
have practically had to sell their political soul to the Labor
Department.... Fortunately, there are some prime sponsors who are
in control of their own local affairs and have not yielded to subtle
dictatorial commands from the bureaucratic holders of the CETA purse
strings .. .who believe in people-centered programs that have educa-
tional as well as training factors in contrast to 'make work 1 ... or
'keep- 'em off street' type programs that develop welfare habits
instead of work habits."
In summation, the roots of a movement toward consolidation of
the various manpower programs into a comprehensive manpower delivery
design and a movement toward decentralization of manpower decision
making, i.e., decategorization and decentralization were traced.
The movement began in 1965 and culminated in the enactment of the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1973. The
following salient factors emerged:
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Decategorization and decentralization are doubtful: stronq
oversight role by Department of Labor has mitigated against
local autonomy and local decision making; Department of
Labor emphasis upon national programs and national priori-
ties have resulted in a categorical nature to the CETA
program
.
CETA consolidated all existing manpower programs under the
aegis of the Department of Labor resulting in a continuation
of emphasis upon income transfer mechanisms, such as work
experience and public service jobs. It is estimated that
CETA has expended some $46 billion from fiscal year 1974 to
1981, and the vast majority of these expenditures has been
on income maintenance programs, rather than vocational skills
training programs.
The Department of Labor under the CETA program has further
reduced the influence of the educational community upon
the manpower programs.
The quality of the remaining training programs is question-
able primarily due to the insistance by the Department of
Labor that training programs be low cost, thereby fostering
programs of a remedial and referral nature, while skills
training programs focused upon entry level training.
Hampden County Massachusetts Programs
Hampden County is located in Western Massachusetts and is
comprised of several core cities and surrounding suburbia. Spring-
field is the largest of the Western Massachusetts cities and has
often vied with Worcester for the honor of being second in population
to Boston.
Hampden County has been a microcosm of the manpower milieu.
The essential thrusts of national manpower programs had local
counterparts: Nieghborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, JOBS,
Work Incentive Program (WIN), Public Service Careers, Public Employ-
ment Program, Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), and Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA) were all operative at various
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times during the categorical days, 1961 through 1973. Only Job
Corps was not operative during the categorical days, but refused
to go unrecognized and instituted a Job Corps Center at Westover
Air Force Base in Chicopee, Massachusetts, under the auspices of
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).
Hampden County experienced the pangs of turfdom, i.e., the
local programs reflected, rather than initiated, the battle for
manpower supremacy. Hence, there was little to no cooperation and
coordination of manpower efforts at the local level in Hampden
County; in actuality, the local program operators were often antagon-
istic toward each other and deprecating of the efforts of each other.
For instance, the director of the local MDTA skills center would
battle with the Employment Security (DES) and with the local CEP;
thereby reflecting on a local level the biases inherent in HEW, DOL
and 0E0 on a national level.
The concept of the local level reflecting the national problems
has been suggested by several manpower professionals. Davidson (1972,
p. 6) refers to this phenomenon: "Such rivalry among federal agencies
was bound to be reflected in the states and localities where the man-
power dollars eventually went." As James Fisler has written, ...field
problems are less sui generis than a mirroring of problems at the
center.
"
Completing the microcosm was, of course, the Cooperative Area
Manpower Planning Committee (CAMP) with the same fate: failure.
Two interesting phenomena emerged from the Hampden County manpower
environ: CAMP and CEP personnel integrated to become the CETA
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prime sponsor (the CETA manpower administrative arm for the local
governments) and the MDTA skills center survived the dissolution of
MDTA.
The coalescing of CEP and CAMP expertise into the new CETA
administrative agency was a natural extension on a local level of
National Department of Labor policy, for the intent of CAMPS was
administrative coordination of manpower efforts while CEP was a
programmatic effort at coordination. Therefore, the personnel of
these agencies internalized the philosophy of comprehensive manpower
program delivery and were a natural choice to administer the CETA
manpower delivery system.
However, old rivalries die hard, and the personalities that
were often antagonistic to one another had assumed different roles:
admi ni strator and contractee. The new CETA administrators were
0E0 and DOL program operators, e.g., the Hampden County Manpower
Admi nis trator was an admi nis trator of the Neighborhood Youth Corps
and then the CAMP Secretariat before becoming the Chief Administra-
tive official of the Hampden County CETA programs; and many of his
administrative staff had came from NYC and CEP programs. The major
focus of the antagonism was the MDTA program administered by Spring-
field School Department officials, i.e., Labor versus Education.
The survival of the MDTA skills center in an environment of
hostility is amazing. However, not only did it survive, when many
of its counterparts died due to the hostility emanating from the
Department of Labor-dominated delivery system, the Hampden County
MDTA institution actually grew and improved during the CETA years.
The success of this anarchronism is worthy of further consideration.
63
The Hampden District Regional Skills Center (HDRSC) was founded
in September 1970, 11 ...as the result of a series of meetings between
Frank D. Gulluni, Edward S. Kosier, Director of Putnam, and School
Superintendent Dr. John E. Deady" (HDRSC Brochure, p. 1). The
founding of a skills center was a direct result of recognition of
the shortcomings of operating manpower programs in the evenings at
Putnam Vocational High School by the Springfield School Department
admi nistrators
.
The initial program options and funding were limited: program
funding was barely over $100,000, and program options were basically
remedial education with few vocational skills training programs,
such as clerical, food service, and auto body. Despite the fact that
the Hampden District Regional Skills Center was a late starter in the
MDTA delivery system, it appears that the institution had to create,
on its own, a manpower delivery design. It therefore developed
individualized instruction (the open entry/exit concept), an assess-
ment system, employment development plan (EDP), training support
team (TST) and other successful manpower training modalities in
isolation from other successful MDTA skills centers.
During the final years of MDTA, the Hampden District Skills
Center was funded at approximately a half million dollars. This, of
course, was a reflection of the funding commitment to MDTA on a
national level. Yet, during this five-year period, the Skills
Center sophisticated its service to the manpower participant and
became skills training oriented, i.e., the earlier emphasis upon
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remedial education had given way to a modality wherein academic
education served as related instruction to the vocational areas.
Perhaps the single factor most essential to the growth and
development of the HDR Skills Center was the force of personality
of its founding father: Frank D. Gulluni. It was his insistence
that resulted in the development of programs that met the needs of
the manpower participant, and it was his charisma that was essential
to the survival of the HDR Skills Center during the initial hostile
years of CETA.
Paradoxically, the HDR Skills Center actually prospered in
misamic environ created by the Hampden County CETA administrators.
The funding of the HDR Skills Center increased from a half million
dollar level under the aegis of MDTA to nearly $2 million in fiscal
year 1978 under CETA. Yet, the threat of complete defunding of the
Skills Center by the local CETA administrator prompted the Skills
Center Director to enter the political arena, i.e., supporting a
successful mayoral candidate. Agency preservation was the motive
for political involvement by the Skills Center Director. The new
mayor appointed the HDR Skills Center Director to the post of
Manpower Admi ni strator
,
thereby removing the threat to the Skills
Center
.
The transition of CETA power to the former MDTA Skills Center
Director resulted in the provision of a supportive role of Hampden
County CETA administration rather than the previous antagonistic
role. Under this supportive environ, the HDR Skills Center flour-
ished: funding levels increased to the $3 million level, and
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program options were increased and sophisticated. Emphasis was
directed toward intermediate and advanced skills training so that
participants could be trained for entry into skilled positions,
rather than the unskilled or semi-skilled positions for which too
many MDTA and CETA training programs had directed their efforts.
The HDR Skills Center began offering programs, such as, Electronic
Test Technician, Computer Programming, Machine Technology, Tool and
Die, and Drafting.
Also, during the tenure of Frank D. Gulluni as Area Manpower
Administrator, the HDR Skills Center received national recognition
as one of the best manpower training facilities in the country, for
it has been recognized that the HDR Skills Center is providing neces-
sary viable vocational skills training for its trainees.
Hence, while most MDTA programs withered and died under the
CETA delivery system, the HDR Skills Center programs actually thrived
the MDTA HDR Skills Center provided training for hundred of parti-
cipants, while the CETA HDR Skills Center programs literally trained
thousands and many were trained and placed in intermediate and
advanced skills.
In summation, the manpower environ extant in Hampden County
over the past two decades was described. This description has
postulated the concept that Hampden County was a microcosm of the
national manpower environ during the categorical days and the
Hampden County also has been a CETA paradox. The paradoxical nature
of the Hampden County CETA program has been the success of a viable
skills training center in a hostile Department of Labor manpower
delivery system.
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The HDR Skills Center has emphasized intermediate and advanced
skills training that has a high cost factor while the Department of
Labor has emphasized 1 ow-cost mi nimal skills development on a national
basis. The HDR Skills Center contends that its trainees are placed
in higher wage jobs with maximum opportunity for career advancement,
a definite contrast to the low-skill, low-paying, high- turnover jobs
that many CETA participants experience. The paradox is further
heightened when one considers the excellent national recognition
afforded the HDR Skills Center.
Selected Review of Extant Manpower Research
Post-Training Earnings are
Often at Poverty Level
One of the most striking and sobering findings of manpower
research is that manpower programs have increased earnings of the
participants, but, as a rule, the after-trai ni ng earnings were still
poverty level. This phenomenon is likely a direct outgrowth of the
Department of Labor's insistence upon low-cost, short-duration,
minimal skills development training and placement into low/semi-
skilled, high-turnover jobs. Goldstein (1972, p. 14) corrments upon
the paradox of manpower programs increasing wages while leaving the
participant in poverty: "It is sobering to note that even those
studies with the most optimistic results estimate average post-
training annual earnings levels well below the poverty line."
The "MDTA Outcomes Study Final Report, April 1972," arrives at
a similar conclusion: "The median annual earnings for the
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institutional enrollees following training was $4 ,473 per year;
that of the OJT enrollees, $3,849. Both estimates hover near the
top range of poverty incomes depending upon family size and loca-
tion. The climb for the average MDTA enrol lee was from well within
the poverty level to its upper margins (MDTA Outcomes Study, 1972,
p. 1.6). Finally, Garth Mangum provides a candid assessment of
MDTA training outcomes: "The average enrollee.
. .has experienced
a substantial improvement in employment and earnings as a result
of participation in the program. Average earnings remain at poverty
levels..." (Mangum & Walsh, 1973, p. 48).
Most CETA Training Has Been
Short-Term, Entry-Level
A major goal of the Department of Labor is to facilitate the
employment of the United States labor force; consequently, it has,
as a rule, mandated that the manpower delivery system process
quickly the disadvantaged individual into the workforce. As a
result, skills training has been minimal, and most training has
been for entry-level positions. Mirengoff and Rindler (1978, p. 129),
in the National Academy of Science Report, noted, "There is evidence
that some Prime Sponsors were adjusting classroom training content
to conform to a low-cost strategy .. .and shortening the training to
provide just enough preparation to get the imnediate job New
York City, Topeka .. .reported a shift in occupational skills training
from industrial and manufacturing skills to less costly training
in- service skills.
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Paradoxically, there is research evidence to suggest that
longer training results in increased earning capacity of the CETA
participant. Robert Taggart (1981, p. 103) states, "Longer class-
room training has greater earnings impact. The 1978 gain for
1976 classroom trainees who stayed in CETA over 40 weeks was more
than six times the gain for those who stayed 11 to 20 weeks."
The National Council on Employment Policy candidly stated,
"The federal pressure is to keep per participant costs low and to
insure immediate placement. These objectives are accomplished by
stressing short-term training averaging less than half a year for
high turnover occupations for which a disadvantaged person can be
prepared at entry level in a short time" (CETA's Results and Their
Implications, 1981, p. 5).
Manpower Funds Have Been Expended
Principally Upon Income Transfer
Programs, Such As, Public Service
Employment (PSE) and Work
Experience
The Department of Labor has had the principal administrative
responsi bi 1 i ty for the manpower delivery system, resulting in a con-
centration on income transfer programs
,
such as, PSE and work exper-
ience, at the expense of skills training. Yet, "Evaluation studies...
found. . .institutional and on-the-job training programs had generally
greater impact on earnings and employment than either work experience
or public employment programs (CETA Reauthorization Issues, 1978,
P- 14).
69
Eli Ginzberg, Chairman of the National Manpower Advisory
Committee and the National Commission for Manpower Policy, lamented
this tragedy in the following manner: "Congress increased its
appropriations over the decade from about $50 million to $2.5 bil-
lion annually for manpower training and employment.... most of the
money goes for wages and income maintenance and less than half a
billion is spent specifically for programs directed at skills
acquisition" (Federal Manpower Policy In Transition, 1974, p. 76).
"The long-term core of MDTA-ins ti tutional training - funded at
about $280 million in fiscal year 1966 - was actually lower in
fiscal year 1971 (about $265 million). In percentage terms, the
decline was precipitous, from 45 to 18 percent of the total training
obligations of the Department of Labor" (Federal Manpower Policy
In Transition, 1974, p. 68).
Mirengoff and Rindler (1978, p. 6) describe this phenomenon
as follows. There has been, however, a relative movement away
from preparation for economic self-sufficiency toward subsidized
jobs. Relative expenditures for the major Title I development pro-
grams, classroom and on-the-job training, declined between 1974 and
1976, while the proportion of expenditures for work experience and
other income maintenance programs rose." "As the recession per-
sisted, the Title VI public service employment program grew and
soon overshadowed the Title I programs..." (p. 3).
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Demographic Characteristics May
Impact Upon the Earnings Capacity
of the CETA Participant
Manpower research findings suggest that the earning capacity
of the manpower participant may be affected by demographic character-
istics, such as, age, sex, race, and education. However, the find-
ings were not always consistent for a given demographic characteristic.
Age
Age is one of the variables that findings conflict as to its
significance in manpower research: Sommers finds that: "...age is
positively and significantly related to earnings..." Goldstein
(1972, p. 12) reports that age was not a consistently significant
factor in the MDTA studies: "There was no consistent relationship
between age and the impact of training." Yet, the WIN studies
indicated that youth and older workers had difficulty obtaining jobs.
Sex
The preponderance of evidence indicates that males fare better
than females in employment and earnings: Goldstein (1972 , p. 11),
"...males who were exposed to institutional training had
signifi-
cant increases in earnings while females did not
benefit.
Race
Generally, manpower research has found that
minorities usually
earn less and are employed less frequently
with the Hispanic popu-
lation as an occasional exception to this
general rule. Perry
concludes, "...on the average, white enrollees
enjoyed slightly
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higher post- training wages than blacks..." (Perry et al
. , 1976, p. 114).
Goldstein (1972) found mixed evidence in his review of manpower
research. Both the "MDTA Outcomes Study" Final Report April, 1972,
and Sawhney, Sum, and Jantzen (1978) found that the Hispanic popu-
lation fared better than whites or blacks. MDTA Outcome Study states
its findings in the following manner: "Spanish-American enrollees
realize, on the average, greater gains in annual income than white
or black enrollees" (MDTA Outcomes Study, 1972, p. 1.6). "Contrary
to expectations, the Spanish-speaking not only were slightly more
likely to obtain jobs than non-Spanish-speaking but also enjoyed
slightly higher wages (Sawhney et al
. , 1978, p. 14).
Education
The preponderance of evidence suggests that the level of
education has a direct influence upon employment and earnings.
Sawhney et al
. ,(1978) find that high school graduates were more
likely to be placed than those with less education. However,
Goldstein (1972, p. 11) found the antithesis in his review of MDTA
literature: "Training had a greater impact on the earnings of
those with less education. Several studies found that training
benefited high school dropouts more than graduates." In his review
of NYC literature, he concluded that high school dropouts showed
a higher benefit-cost ratio than graduates.
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Implications of Literature Review Upon This Study
A central theme in manpower literature has been the provlivity
of the Department of Labor to concentrate upon income transfer and
upon minimal skills development training programs, resulting in
placement of participants into entry-level jobs with the potential
for high turnover. As a result, manpower research has consistently
demonstrated that generally many manpower training participants
did not extricate themselves from poverty earnings. This study
concerns itself with the HDR Skill Center program that has developed
a cluster approach to vocational training, including a sophistication
of available skills so that a participant could conceivably learn
advanced skills, resulting in employment and earnings that should
extricate the participant from poverty earnings.
Consequently, the central focus of this study is to determine
whether this approach to training has indeed resulted in Hampden
County participant earnings sufficient to extricate the Hampden
County training participant from poverty. Several research ques-
tions are naturally generated from the above central focus and are
considered in the section entitled "Questions To Be Answered."
The most desired reserach design would be a long-term experi-
mental model; however, time and money constraints usually debar
the researcher from utilizing this model. In fact, these constraints
have resulted in the absence of this design from manpower research.
Gay and Borus (1980), in discussing the implications of an experi-
mental design in the studying of CEJA programs, conclude" "A
73
primary reason for the lack of impact evaluation has been an in-
ability to make the necessary investment of time and funds."
Assuredly
,
these limitations are far more intensively restrictive
upon the Doctoral candidate. Consequently, this researcher con-
sidered the quasi
-experimental and descriptive models and has set-
tled upon a descriptive model primarily due to the fact that con-
ditions that resulted in past control problems inherent in quasi
-
experimental manpower research are operative today (e.g., control
group incompatibility).
A serious shortcoming of manpower research has been its time
limitations: most manpower research has been restricted to a six-
month duration primarily due to high subject mobility and to inade-
quate management information systems (MIS) — unfortunately, these
conditions persist today. Short-term research fails to provide
sufficient insight into the economic impact that the program may
have had. Consequently, this is an 18-month descriptive study
designed to determine the economic impact that a Hampden County
training program had upon the Hampden County training participant:
Were 18-month earnings sufficient to extricate the participant from
poverty?
Although the design of this study addresses itself to two
major issues: the absence of long-term studies and the concept of
extrication of the Hampden County training CETA participant from
poverty earnings, there are several other issues that this research
design seeks to address:
The design is analytical as opposed to a descrption of the
program so prevalent in the manpower research environ.
74
J?tpmnt
d
+
focu
n
ses up
°? the occupational training mix in an
attempt to analyze which occupational training programs
result in earnings sufficient to extricate the Hampden
county participant from poverty.
The study also focuses upon 18-month earnings by aqe
sex, race, and education.
Summa ry
Historical Background
Manpower programs have been ad hoc responses to Congressional ly
perceived dysfunctions of the social and economic institutions of
the United States. What began as a moderate response in the early
years of the 1960's has mushroomed into a complex, multi-billion
dollar service delivery system.
The Area Redevelopment Act (ARA), 1961, and the Manpower
Development and Training Act, 1962, are considered as the incipient
beginning of a quasi-educati onal system that has spent billions of
dollars in nearly two decades. The principal focus of ARA was basic-
ally economic development of economically depressed areas; however,
it also contained a small training component and, as such, recog-
nized the need for vocational training of people located in de-
pressed areas.
The initial focus of MDTA, however, was vocational retraining
of the technologically unemployed male, head of household. Appro-
priation levels of both ARA and MDTA in the initial years were
less than a hundred million dollars. Yet, manpower programs were
destined to become a billion dollar quasi -educati onal delivery
system.
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The irony for the educator is that Congress had originally
turned to Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Office
of Education, to draft legislation designed to rectify the perceived
labor market dysfunction of technological displacement of workers,
but the Office of Education expressed little interest while the
Department of Labor (DOL) was anxious to administer such a system.
In fact, DOL ardently believed that it was the natural agency to
design and to administer a manpower system, for DOL believed that
Education was not attuned to the skill needs of industry or to the
training needs of an adult disadvantaged population. Consequently,
the initial disinterest of Education and the aggressive pursuit of
manpower by DOL had resulted in DOL as the principal federal agency
responsible for MDTA and for subsequent manpower programs: Educa-
tion was never to recover from its initial faux pas.
Manpower programs proliferated during the mid-1 960's, primarily
as a component measure against the "war on poverty." The Economic
Opportunity Act spawned several manpower programs: Neighborhood
Youth Corps (NYC), New Careers, Operation Mainstream, Special Impact,
and Job Corps. These programs were initially administered by the
Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0) (later the Community Service
Agency) and were principally work experience and public service jobs.
In short, the 0E0 programs were basically income transfer rather
than vocational training.
The 1960's also witnessed the targeting of manpower services
to the economically disadvantaged population. The National Alliance
of Business Job Opportunity Program (NAB JOBS) was a DOL-administered
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program to entice the business community into providing a cornnit-
ment to the poor. The Welfare Incentive Program (WIN) was Welfare's
attempt at training and employing the Welfare client.
It became obvious that these diverse, disparate programs were
competing, overlapping, and were very often duplicative and waste-
ful. Worse, they forced the participant to fit into program require-
ments rather than provide for the individual needs of the participant.
Consequently, as early as 1965 when the manpower programs began to
proliferate, there were proponents for consolidation. The Depart-
ment of Labor aggressively pursued consolidation under DOL aegis.
In 1967, DOL administratively initaited the Concentrated Employment
Program (CEP), which was a programmatic attempt at coordination of
local manpower programs in targeted areas. The concept of one agency
to coordinate the several manpower programs in a target area was
commendable, but it was a failure.
The Department of Labor also attempted in 1967 to coordinate
the planning of the various manpower programs administered by
several federal agencies such as, DOL, HEW and 0E0. The Cooperative
Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) was to coordinate the planning
of all manpower programs in a given area so that duplication, waste,
and territorial fighting would give way to a comprehensive plan in
an area making the best possible use of the federal manpower dollar,
no matter what the source. CAMPS was initiated through a federal
interagency agreement and, as such, had no legislative mandate, and
therefore, the plans were usually a worthless compilation of the
separate programs.
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These ineffective attempts at coordination convinced many
that legislation was the only realistic answer. Proposed legisla-
tion envisioned consolidation and decentralization of manpower
programs. Initial legislative attempts began in 1968 and culminated
with the passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) in December 1973 under the aegis of the Department of Labor.
In short, the Department of Labor achieved its goal of domination
and control over all manpower programs, which had exceeded a billion
dollars in annual appropriations by 1973. However, decategorization
(i.e., the elimination of separate programs) and decentralization
are doubtful principally due to a strong oversight role of the
Department of Labor and to a DOL emphasis upon national programs and
national priorities.
Achieving consolidation under the administrative authority of
DOL has dire complications to the educational institutions of this
country: A separate manpower delivery system, which could have had
a vocational education (i.e., skills training) focus, has evolved
from a modest several million dollar program to a multi-billion
dollar system that has favored income maintenance and work exper-
ience to that of vocational skills development, and has effectively
debarred the educational community from substantive contributions
to the fledgling system.
In short, billions of dollars have been expended over the
past two decades with the vast majority being income maintenance
programs, such as, work experience and public service jobs, while
the training program quality has also been suspect, i.e., even
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the minimal dollars spent on training, with few exceptions, have
not been on viable vocational training programs. Many training
programs were remedial or referral in nature.
In essence, then, the initial faux pas by Education has re-
sulted in its debarment from a quasi-educational system that per-
haps needed guidance by Education and, now, as a consequence,
competes with Education for the federal dollar. Billions could have
been spent on vocational training, but were not as a result of DOL
dominance on the manpower environ.
The national manpower delivery system has left its imprimatur
on local systems across the country. In fact, Hampden County,
Massachusetts has been a microcosm of the national manpower milieu
over the past two decades and also has been a CETA paradox. The
paradoxical nature of the Hampden County CETA program has been the
success of a viable skills training center in a somewhat hostile
Department of Labor manpower delivery system.
Selected Review of Extant
Manpower Research
Manpower research has produced a consensus on several key
issues: post-training earnings are often as poverty level (i.e.,
the manpower training participant has, as a rule, not extricated
himself from poverty); most CETA training has been short-term,
entry-level (despite evidence that longer training results in in-
creased post-training earnings); manpower funds have been expended
principally upon income transfer programs, such as, Public Service
Employment (PSE) and Work Experience (despite evidence that training
79
results in higher post-program earnings); and finally, demographic
characteristics, such as, age, sex, race, and education may have
an impact upon post-traini ng earnings.
These findings have been utilized to help focus this research
effort as stated in "Implications of the Literature Review Upon This
Study.
"
Implications of the Literature
Review Upon This Study
The Literature Review has raised issues concerning the economic
impact of manpower training programs upon the participant and con-
cerning the viability of extant manpower research. This research
seeks to address several issues raised in the literature review:
This research effort is an 18-month follow-up upon the
earning capacity of the CETA Hampden County training
participant as opposed to 3- to 12-month research design
of most manpower research.
This research effort concentrates on a crucial theme: has
the CETA Hampden County training participant extricated
himself from poverty?
This research effort is analytical as opposed to a descrip-
tion of program activities as is so prevalent in the
manpower research environ.
This research focuses upon the component parts of a delivery
system, i.e., the occupational training mix, while most
extant manpower research focuses upon the total delivery
system.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Introducti on
The purpose of this 18-month study is to determine the econ-
omic impact that training at the Hampden District Regional Skills
Center has had upon the Hampden County, Massachusetts training
participant. Manpower research has demonstrated that most manpower
training participant earnings after training program participation
are generally in and around poverty. Manpower literature suggests
that this phenomenon may be due to the fact that most manpower
training programs impart job "entry-level" skills to the participant.
In contrast, the HDR Skills Center has a training program
design that offers cluster skills in Machine Occupations and Elec-
tronic Occupations. These programs offer the participant the
opportunity to exit training at entry, intermediate or advanced
ski 11 s level
.
Consequently, the central focus of this 18-month study is to
determine whether the earnings of the Hampden County training parti-
cipants who trained at the HDR Skills Center were sufficient to
extricate the Hampden County training participant from poverty as
measured by the Office of Management and Budget.
80
81
Popul ation
The subjects were Hampden County, Massachusetts CETA train-
ing participants who trained at the HDR Skills Center, Springfield,
Massachusetts. The participants completed various occupational
training programs between April and October 1980, resulting in a
variance of weeks between program completion and follow-up from a
low of 74 weeks to a high of 100 weeks. Seventeen (17) cases
were below 78 weeks (18 months); the balance of the cases were 78
weeks or more.
The contact group numbered 134; however, due to insufficient
earnings data on several participants, 8 were dropped from consider-
ation in this study, resulting in a study group of 126 subjects.
Instrumental on
An abbreviated form of a statewide questionnaire developed by
the Research Unit of the Department of Manpower Development (DMD)
was utilized by the Institute for Governmental Services of the
University of Massachusetts to conduct a telephonic 18-month CETA
participant follow-up for the Hampden County Employment and
Training Consortium.
DMD has pilot tested the questionnaire and has established
reliability and validity. The abbreviated instrument has been
used basically to generate employment and wage data while the
Hampden County Employment and Training Consortium automated data
system was utilized to provide demographic information for the
subject file.
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Data Collection
The raw data files from the Hampden County Employment and
Training Consortium (HCETC) 18-month CETA Participant Follow-up
Study, Study Report No. 1, Title 11-B, April 1981, have been
utilized as the data source for this study.
Employment, earnings, and demographic data were keypunched
and stored in case files by the Institute for Governmental
Services
.
Information germane to this study was printed out in case
file format. Permission to conduct this study was granted by the
Hampden County Employment and Training Consortium.
Data Treatment
The computer printout contained all earning and demographic
information in individual file format. All computations were
completed manual ly
.
Total 18-month earnings were determined through the applica-
tion of the following formula:
78 weeks
actual no. of weeks
between program com-
pletion and follow-up
adjustment total
= 78 k earnings
Factor earnings
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An adjustment factor was necessitated by the need for standard
comparative total earning figures since the actual number of weeks
between program completion and follow-up varied from a low of 74
weeks to a high of 100 weeks. The adjustment factor increased
earnings for 17 cases and decreased earnings for 109 cases.
Eighteen-month Office of Management and Budget (0MB) poverty
levels were determined by the following formula:
0MB poverty level for
a given family size
fiscal year 79-80 and
80-81
2
x 1.5 = 18 month poverty level
e.g., Family Size 1: FY 79-80 $3,400
_
$7,190
FY 80-81 $3,790 2
$3,595 (annual
poverty level)
x 1 .5 = $5,393
18-month poverty
1 evel
An average of two 0MB guidelines were used since the weeks
worked by participants overlapped two 0MB poverty guidelines.
Data presented in Chapter IV, Findings of the Research, will
be presented in 18-month format. However, the following chart
presents 0MB poverty levels by family size in a 12-month and in an
18-month format. The reader may wish to compare earnings with the
0MB poverty levels on a yearly basis. To determine the yearly
earnings, 18-month earnings are divided by 1.5.
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12-Month 0MB Poverty Levels 18-Month 0MB Povertv IpvpK
Family Size
0MB Poverty
Earnings Level Family Size
0MB Poverty
Earninqs Level
1 $3,595 1 $ 5,393
2 $4,755 2 $ 7,133
3 $5,915 3 $ 8,873
4 $7,075 4 $10,613
5 $8,235 5 $12,353
6 $9,395 6 $14,093
Arithmetic
: means are used in this study to determine average
earnings of the CETA subjects by age, sex, race. education, and
occupational programs.
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH
Introducti on
A review of extant manpower literature indicates that parti-
cipants of manpower training programs generally do not extricate
themselves from poverty. This researcher has suggested, based upon
his review of literature, that the proclivity of the Department of
Labor, the federal administrative agency for the CETA program, to
concentrate program activities upon minimal skills training pro-
grams, i.e., entry-level skills, is primarily responsible for this
phenomenon
.
The central focus of this study is to determine whether a
vocationally oriented program that provides cluster skills training,
including entry, intermediate, and advanced skills, has indeed re-
sulted in 18-month earnings sufficient to extricate the participant
from poverty. The central focus of this study resulted in the
postulation of several questions to be answered as denoted in Chap-
ter I. The format of Chapter IV, Findings of the Research, will be
to present an analysis of data in a fashion that answers each
question in its postulated order (1-4).
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Findings
Question 1. Have the 18-month earnings of each CETA Hampden
County training participant exceeded the corres-
ponding 18-month U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) poverty level?
Table 1 lists each individual subject by case number. Each case
identifies the sex, race, education, family size, age, and occupational
training program of the subject. Total weeks between program comple-
tion and follow-up, total weeks employed, and total earnings are
presented for each case. The adjustment percentage and the adjusted
78 week (18-month) earnings are also listed for each case. Finally,
a determination (yes/no) of whether each case has exceeded its cor-
responding 0MB poverty earnings level is made in Table 1.
Table 1 data is summarized in Table 2 and is presented here
as a point of referral for the reader who may wish to review the
detailed findings by case number. Basically, Table 2 is divided
into two categories: the number and percentage of cases above the
corresponding 0MB poverty level and the number and percentage of
cases below the corresponding 0MB poverty level.
Data in Table 2 reveal that 85 cases or two-thirds (67%) of
the CETA Hampden County training participants extricated themselves
from poverty by exceeding the corresponding 18 month 0MB poverty
earnings level while the earnings of 41 cases or one-third (33%)
fell below the corresponding 0MB poverty level.
Individual
Comparison
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CETA
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County
Training
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18-Month
Earnings
with
the
Corresponding
0MB
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Level
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Question 2 . Have the 18-month earnings of the average CETA
Hampden County training participant exceeded the
corresponding 18-month 0MB poverty level?
Table 3 is a comparison of the average CETA Hampden County
training participant earnings with the correspondi ng 0MB poverty
level. Table 3 displays the average earnings and average family
size of the 126 subjects and compares the average earnings with
the corresponding 0MB poverty level.
Data in Table 3 show the "average" CETA participant has a
family of two with 18-month earnings of $11,215. The corresponding
18-month 0MB poverty level for a family of two is $7,133. Conse-
quently, the "average" CETA participant substantially exceeded the
0MB poverty level by some $4,082. Actually, the average earnings
of $11,215 are sufficient to extricate a family of four from poverty
by some $602. (0MB poverty level for a family of four is $10,613.)
Question 3 . Are there Hampden County occupational training
programs that have resulted in average 18-month
earnings above/below the 18-month 0MB poverty
level for the average Hampden County participant?
Table 4 compares the average earnings of each occupational
training program; displays the skill level of each occupational
training program; and reveals the number and percentage of cases
above the correspondi ng 0MB poverty level within each occupational
training program.
Table 4 data reveal 8 of 9 occupational training programs
have resulted in average earnings exceeding the corresponding 18-
month 0MB poverty level of $7,133 (i.e., poverty earnings level
Comparison
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for the "average participant" in this study). Food Service was the
only CETA occupational training program resulting in 18-month earn-
ings ($6,943) that were below the corresponding 0MB 18-month
poverty level. However, several entry-level skills program were
slightly above the poverty level of $7, 133 for a family of two:
Graphic Arts - $7,865; Clerical - $8,426; and Auto Body/Mechanics-
$8,517.
In contrast, several programs resulted in average 18-month
earnings that impressively exceeded the corresponding 0MB 18-month
poverty level for the average participant: Machine Shop - $14,871;
Electronics - $20,584; and Machine Set-up - $22,524. Both Elec-
tronics and Machine Set-up are "advanced" skills training programs.
Electronics and Machine Set-up were the programs with the highest
percentage of individual cases exceeding the corresponding 18-month
0MB poverty level at 86%. The hierarchical order of percentage of
individual cases by occupational training program exceeding the
corresponding 18-month 0MB poverty earnings level is as follows:
Machine Set-up - 86%; Electronics - 86%; Machine Shop - 79%; Graphic
Arts - 75%; Drafting - 67%; Clerical - 64%; E.B.A. - 53%, Food
Service,- 56%; and Auto Body /Mechanics - 50%.
Table 5 contrasts individual earnings of participants in the
two highest and two lowest 18-month average earnings Occupational
training programs. Machine Set-up and Electronics are the two highest
average earnings 18-month Occupational training programs while
Graphic Arts and Food Service are the two lowest. Table 5 identifies
the Occupational training program, the case number, the family size.
- 98 -
Table 5
Comparison of Individual 18-Month Earnings by the Two Highest
and Two Lowest Occupational Program 18-Month Average Earning
Category
Case
Number
Family
Size
18-Month
Earnings
Corresponding
18-Month 0MB
Poverty Level
Exceed 0MB
Yes/No
Earnings Above
18-Month 0MB
Poverty Level
Machine Set-up 34 1 $24,492 $ 5,393 Yes $19,099
Machine Set-Up 35 3 $23,353 $ 8,873 Yes $14,480
Machine Set-Up 37 2 $ 1,273 $ 7,133 No
Machine Set-Up 67 1 $27,758 $ 5,393 Yes $22,365
Machine Set-Up 74 1 $24,960 $ 5,393 Yes $19,567
Machine Set-Up 78 1 $26,520 $ 5,393 Yes $21 ,127
Machine Set-Up 93 1 $29,309 $ 5,393 Yes $23,916
Electronics 28 1 $25,454 $ 5,393 Yes $20,061
Electronics 29 2 $18,410 $ 7,133 Yes Sll ,277
Electronics 77 1 $20,844 $ 5,393 Yes $15,451
Electronics 83 3 $26,052 $ 8,873 Yes $17,179
Electronics 94 5 $23,044 $12,353 Yes $10,691
Electronics 97 1 $23,465 $ 5,393 Yes $18,072
Electronics 133 2 $ 6,817 $ 7,133 No --
Graphic Arts 1 4 $ 6,445 $10,613 No ..
Graphic Arts 39 1 $ 6,028 $ 5,393 Yes S 635
Graphic Arts 47 1 $10,391 $ 5,393 Yes S 4,998
Graphic Arts 114 1 $ 8,596 $ 5,393 Yes $ 3,203
Food Service 16 1 $ 2,212 $ 5,393 No
Food Service 24 1 $10,461 $ 5,393 Yes S 5,068
Food Service 27 1 $11 ,606 $ 5,393 Yes $ 6,213
Food Service 42 2 $ 2,083 $ 7,133 No --
Food Service 44 1 $ 6,046 $ 5,393 Yes $ 653
Food Service 84 1 $ 4,738 $ 5,393 No --
Food Service 102 7 $ 119 $17,573 No --
Food Service 116 2 $10,012 $ 7,133 Yes $ 2,879
Food Service 125 1 $15,214 $ 5,393 Yes $ 9,821
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the individual 18-month earnings, the corresponding 18-month 0MB
poverty level; and determines whether the individual 18-month earn-
ings exceeded the corresponding 0MB 18-month poverty level and by
what amount.
The contrast is quite dramatic: data demonstrate that the
individual earnings of participants in the Machine Set-up and
Electronics programs unequivocally extricate the participant from
poverty. Actually, the earnings, mid- to upper-$20,000 range, are
sufficient to move the participant from poverty to middle-class
earning status. (It should be remembered that CETA eligibility is
based upon economic poverty, i.e., the participant must be at or
below poverty earnings in order to participate in the CETA training
program.
)
In contrast, the individual earnings of the two lowest 18-month
average earning occupational programs. Graphic Arts and Food Service,
are somewhat meager 18-month earnings, resulting in earnings that
were in and around poverty.
Electronics and Machine Set-up are "advanced" skills training
programs while Graphic Arts and Food Service are "entry-level"
skills training programs. The vast differences in earning capacities
of participants from these programs are likely attributable to the
increased skill level that participants bring to the employer,
thereby commanding a greater starting salary.
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Question 4 . What were the 18-month earnings by aqe, sex
race and education?
Table 6 compares average 18-month earnings by age categories
(18-21, 22-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50+) and reveals the number and
percentage of cases above the corresponding 0MB poverty level
within each age category.
Table 6 represents comparative age data, displaying the
following information: the average 18-month earnings were $11,215.
The 18-21 age category had the highest 18-month average earnings
at $13,262, while the 40-49 age category had the lowest average 18-
month earnings at $4,871. (Note that N's are indeed small, 18-21 -
N= 1 3 and 40-49 - N=8
.
)
The 22-29 age category earnings of $11,918 and the 30-39 age
category earnings of $11 ,259 slightly surpassed the average 18-month
earnings of $11,215 while the 50+ age category earnings of $9,534
were considerably below the average 18-month earnings for all age
groups
.
The 40-49 age category was the only age group failing to extri-
cate itself from poverty. Their 18-month average earnings of
$4,817 were substantially below the 18-month 0MB poverty earnings of
$7,133, i.e., the 18-month 0MB poverty level for the "average"
parti ci pant.
The 18-21 age category had the highest percentage of individual
cases exceeding the corresponding 0MB 18-month poverty earnings
level at 92%. The hierarchical percentage of individual cases by
18-Month
Earnings
By
Age
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age exceeding the corresponding 18-month 0MB poverty earnings
level is as follows: 18-21 - 92%; 22-29 - 71%; 50+ - 67%; 30-39 -
63%; and 40-49 - 25%.
Table 7 provides further insight into the phenomenon of the
18-21 youth earning on the "average" more than the 40-49 and 50+
age categories by listing individual earnings by case number.
Table 7 displays case number, age, sex, occupational training pro-
gram, and earnings by age category.
Several factors emerge: in the 18-21 age category, there
are two cases of "advanced" skills (Machine Set-up) resulting in
substantial earnings in two of the thirteen cases, $24,492 and
$26,520, respectively. Actually, when these two cases are removed
from consideration, the average earnings of the remaining cases
fall from $13,262 to $11,035 (somewhat below average earnings for
all age groups)
.
The drastically low earnings from the 40-49 age category
appear to be directly attributable to low employment participation
i.e., two cases were totally unemployed while a third case earned
$119 in eighteen months. Removing these cases from consideration,
average earnings increase to $8,359. The 40-49 age category parti
cipated in three programs
,
all below the average program earnings
of $11,215, Electronic Bench Assemply - $9,984; Clerical - $8,426;
and Food Service - $6,943. Average earnings for these three pro-
\
grams are $8,541. Consequently, program choice appears to be a
factor causing the difference in the earnings. Sex may also have
been a factor. The 40-49 age category was all female, while the
103
Table 7
Comparison of Individual Earnings By
Age Categories 18-21, 40-49, and 50+
Age
Category
Case
Number Age Sex
Occupational
Training Program Earnings
18-21 34 21 M Machine Set-Up $24,492
78 21 M Machine Set-Up $26,520
54 21 M Machine Shop $ 2,762
92 20 M Electronic Bench
Assembly
$10,798
118 21 M Electronic Bench
Assembly
$17,951
71 21 M Auto Body $14,144
10 21 F Clerical $12,272
36 21 F Clerical $ 9,409
56 21 F Clerical $11 ,649
60 21 F Clerical $ 6,290
98 21 F Clerical $12,345
117 20 F Clerical $15,174
114 21 M Graphic Arts $ 8,596
40-49 100 45 F Electronic Bench
Assembly
-0-
105 43 F Electronic Bench
Assembly
$ 5,410
41 47 F Clerical $12,152
82 46 F Clerical -0-
91 46 F Clerical $11 ,676
130 40 F Clerical $ 4,871
84 49 F Food Service $ 4,738
102 47 F Food Service $ 119
104
Table 7 (continued)
Age
Category
Case
Number Age Sex
Occupational
Training Program Earnings
50+ 133 52 F Electronics $ 6,817
89 59 F Machine Shop $12,187
33 64 M Machine Shop $19,367
59 50 F Clerical $ 4,715
75 50 F Clerical $11 ,752
85 62 F Clerical $ 4,610
106 58 F Clerical $12,202
107 52 F Clerical $13,104
128 54 F Clerical $11 ,062
24 55 F Food Service $10,401
112 64 F Food Service $ 2,083
44 57 F Food Service $ 6,046
105
50+ category had only one male participant. Lastly, the low N's in
each category make the age categories highly susceptible to a few
cases of very high earnings, as demonstrated by the 18-21 age cate-
gory or very low earnings as demonstrated by the 40-49 age category
Table 8 compares the average 18-month earnings by sex and
reveals the number and percentage of cases above the corresponding
0MB poverty level within each sex category.
The average male 18-month earnings of $15,438 were substan-
tially above the average participant 18-month earnings of $11,215,
while the average female 18-month earnings of $8,106 were sub-
stantially below the average participant earnings. The average
male 18-month earnings were $7,332, or 87% higher than the average
female 18-month earnings. Both groups extricated themselves from
the 0MB poverty level for the "average" participant: males more
than doubled the 0MB poverty earnings for the average participant
($15,438 vs. $7,133); however, females did not fare as well,
exceeding the 0MB poverty line by less than $1,000 ($8,108 vs.
$7,133). Finally, 80% of the male cases exceeded the correspond-
ing 0MB poverty earnings level, while 58% of the female cases
exceeded the correspond!' ng 0MB poverty earnings level.
Table 9 displays the number and percentage of cases by sex
in each occupational training program, providing a patently clear
contrast of occupational training programs by sex.
Data demonstrate quite clearly the differences in program
participation by sex: 69% of female cases were trained in Clerical,
a traditionally female occupation. Table 9 shows average 18-month
18-Month
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Table 9
Occupational Training Program By Sex
Category
Occupational
Training Program
Number
of Cases
Percent
of Cases
Male Machine Shop 22 41
Electronic Bench Assembly 9 17
Machine Set-Up 7 13
Electronics 5 9
Auto Body/Mechanics 4 7
Drafting 3 6
Graphics 2 3
Food Service 1 2
Cl erical 1 2
TOTAL 54 100
Female Clerical 50 69
Food Service 8 11
Electronic Bench Assembly 6 8
Graphic Arts 2 3
Auto Body/Mechanics 2 3
Electronics 2 3
Machine Shop 2 3
TOTAL 72 100
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earnings for the Clerical program were $8,426. Forty-one percent
(41%) of the males participated in Machine Shop, 13% in Machine
Set-up, and 9% in Electronics, for a total of 63% in the tradi-
tionally male occupations. Also, these three programs were the
top three in average earnings: Machine Set-up - $22,524; Electron-
ics - $20,584; and Machine Shop - $14,871. Another 3% of the males
participated in Drafting, average earnings of $13,280. Hence, a
total of 66% males participated in programs earning above the
average 18-month earnings for all programs, $11,215.
Contrastingly, 6% females participated in programs earning
above the average 18-month earnings for all programs. Stated
differently, 94% of the female cases participated in programs earn-
ing below the average 18-month earnings for all programs.
Table 10 compares average 18-month earnings by race categories
(Black, Hispanic, and White) and reveals the number and percentage
of cases above the corresponding 0MB poverty level within each race
category.
Table 10 data reveal 18-month earnings by race were similar:
average earnings of all races were around the $11,000 plateau.
However, average 18-month earnings of the White and Hispanic groups
were slightly lower than the 18-month earnings of the average parti-
cipant ($11 ,097 and $10,675 vs. $11,215), while the average 18-
month earnings of the Black group was slightly above the 18-month
earnings of the average participant ($11,771 vs. $11,215). The
earning hierarchy was: Blacks - $11,771; Whites - $11 ,097; and
Hispanics - $10,675. All groups substantially extricated themselves
18-Month
Earnings
By
Race
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from 0MB 18-month poverty earnings level for the average partici-
pant, $7,133.
The hierarchical order of percentage of individual cases by
race exceeding the corresponding 0MB 18-month poverty earning level
is as follows: Blacks - 75%; Whites - 67%; and Hispanics - 50%.
Table 11 compares average 18-month earnings by educational cate-
gories (8 or less, 9-11, high school diploma, and 13+) and reveals
the number and percentage of cases above the corresponding 0MB poverty
level within each educational category.
Average 18-month earnings of the 13+ years of education group
substantially exeeeded 18-month earnings of the average participant
($17,184 vs. $11,215), while average 18-month earnings of the 8 years
or less were substanti al ly below the 18-month earnings of the average
participant ($6,895 vs. $11,215). Interestingly, the 9-11 years
of education group earned more on an average in the 18-month period
than did the high school graduate ($11,470 vs. $9,902). The 13+
and the 9-11 years of education groups were the only groups to sur-
pass the earnings of the average participant ($17,184, $11 ,470, vs.
$11,215). The 8 years or less education group was the only group
with average 18-month earnings below the 0MB poverty line for the
"average" participant ($6,895 vs. $7,133).
Paradoxi cal ly , the High School Diploma group is at the bottom
of the hierarchical order of percentage of individual cases by
educational grouping exceeding the corresponding 0MB 18-month
poverty earnings level: 13+ - 90%; 9-11 - 70%; 8 or less - 63%;
and High School Diploma - 61%. An underlying cause of this
18-Month
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phenomenon may be sex: The High School Diploma category has 63%
female participants, while the 9-11 category has only 45% female
participants. Hence, the High School Diploma category may have
been affected by the Lower earning capacity of the female parti-
cipant. Table 8 has clearly demonstrated the higher earning capa-
city of the Hampden County CETA male participant.
Table 12 compares average 18-month earnings by race/sex
categories and reveals the number and percentage of cases above the
corresponding 0MB poverty level within each race/sex category.
Average 18-month earnings of the White Male substantially
eclipsed average earnings of all other race/sex groups. The average
earnings of Males by race were as follows: White Male - $18,002;
Hispanic Male - $13,896; and Black Male - $13,168. All average
Male earnings by race were more than the earnings of the average
participant ($18,002, $13,896, $13,168 vs. $11,215) while all average
Female earnings by race were less than the earnings of the average
participant (Black - $9,284; White - $7,857; Hispanic - $7,455 vs.
$11,215). The White Male had the highest percentage of individual
cases exceeding the corresponding 0MB poverty earnings level at 87%,
Black Male has 75%, and Hispanic Male had 71%. The Black Female
had the highest percentage of individual cases exceeding the corres-
ponding 0MB poverty earnings level at 75%, White Female had 59%, and
the Hispanic Female had 28%.
18-Month
Earnings
By
Race/Sex
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pi scussi on
This study focused upon a central issue: Has a vocationally
oriented manpower training program in Hampden County, Massachusetts
providing cluster skills training, including entry, intermediate,
and advanced skills, generated 18-month participant earnings suffi-
cient to extricate the CETA Hampden County training participant
from poverty as measured by the Office of Management and Budget (0MB)?
The central issue surfaced during the literature review when
it became patently clear that the Department of Labor (DOL) over the
past two decades has implemented a policy fostering minimal skills
training programs resulting in the placement of manpower training
participants into entry-level jobs with the potential for high turn-
over .
The literature contained studies demonstrating the training
participant was relatively better off after program completion than
before; however, the participants were usually in and around poverty.
Consequently, the predilection of DOL to concentrate upon labor
force interchange, i.e., quick movement of the unemployed to employed
by providing minimal training, rather than career preparation, has
indeed often resulted in marginal and temporary improvement in the
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economic status of its client population: the economically dis-
advantaged
.
The central issue crystalized when it became obvious that the
Hampden District Regional Skills Center, Hampden County, Massachu-
setts, under the aegis of the Springfield School Department, devel-
oped a vocationally-oriented program providing its participants the
opportunity to exit training at the highest possible skill level,
i.e., entry, intermediate or advanced. In effect, the Hampden
County program design was in direct contrast to the operational DOL
policy of minimal skills training.
Logic dictated the central focus: Could this program design
provide its participants with requisite skills to extricate him/her
from poverty? The cnetral focus generated several related questions:
(1) Have the 18-month earnings of each CETA Hampden County training
participant exceeded the corresponding 18-month U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (0MB) poverty level?; (2) Have the 18-month earnings
of the average CETA Hampden County training participant exceeded
the correspondi ng 18-month 0MB poverty level?; (3) Are there occu-
pational training programs that have resulted in average 18-month
earnings above/below the 18-month poverty level for the average
Hampden County CETA participant? The fourth question, (4) What
were the 18-month earnings by age, sex, race, and education?, is
an important tangential consideration, i.e., the interactional
impact of demographic characterise cs
.
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Question 1 focused upon the individual participant. In effect,
did the program extricate each and every participant from poverty
during an 18-month period? The answer to Question 1 is a qualified
yes. Two-thirds (67%) of the CETA participants' 18-month earnings
were sufficient to extricate the participant from poverty while
one- third (33%) remained in poverty. A review of data in Table 1
reveals vast differences in the magnitude of extrication from
poverty, i.e., some participants hover just above the poverty level
while others moved to middle-class status. For example, case number
93 earned $29,309 in an 18-month period (an annualized salary of
$19,539); is single (considered a family of one); and has exceeded
the corresponding 0MB family of one 18-month poverty earnings level
by $23,916 ($29,309 - $5,393). Case number 31, on the other hand,
earned $6,123 in an 18-month period (an annualized salary of $4,082);
is single (a family of one); and has exceeded the 0MB family of one
18-month poverty earnings level by $730 ($6,123 - $5,393). Never-
theless, many participants exceeded the 18-month poverty earnings
level by several thousand dollars or more.
The fact that a majority of Hampden County CETA participants
extricated themselves from poverty is a direct contrast to most CETA
participants who, as a rule, hover in and around poverty. Mangum,
Goldstein, as well as other researchers, clearly demonstrated that
the manpower training system left the participant on the doorstep
of poverty. Consequently, even though data demand a qualified yes,
it appears the majority of the Hampden County training participants
fared much better than most other CETA participants who were not
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afforded the opportunity to participate in a program providing
intermediate and advanced skills training, as well as entry-level
trai ning.
The researcher often finds it difficult to compare on an
individual basis and therefore relies on averages. Hence, Question
2 concerns itself with the "average" participant. The average CETA
Hampden County training participant convincingly extricated himself
from poverty. Table 3 clearly demonstrates that the average Hampden
County training participant substantially exceeded the 0MB poverty
level. The average CETA Hampden County training participant has one
dependent and is considered a family of two by the 0MB poverty table.
The average 18-month earnings of $11,215 exceeds the corresponding
18-month 0MB poverty level for a family of two, $7,133, by $4,082
(or by an annualized amount of $2,721). In fact, the average CETA
Hampden County training participant could support a family of four
and still remain above the poverty line, although the margin of
$602 would be slim. In short, the answer to Question 2, Have the
18-month earnings of the average CETA Hampden County training
participant exceeded the correspondi ng 18-month 0MB poverty level?,
is an unqualified yes
.
The third question analyzes the impact of occupational mix;
a concept little discussed in manpower research. Yet, the data
from this study would seem to suggest further research in this
area may prove fruitful. The answer to the third question finds
eight of nine occupational programs generated average 18-month
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earnings sufficient to extricate the average Hampden County partici-
pant from poverty earnings level.
Analysis of the data, however, reveals a crucial phenomenon:
there is a substantial disparity of 18-month earnings between "ad-
vanced" and "entry-level" skills training programs. The advanced
skills training programs demonstrated higher average earnings and a
greater percentage of individual participants extricating themselves
from poverty. Machine Set-up and Electronics are "advanced" skills
training programs; their average 18-month earnings of $22,524 and
$20,584 contrast sharply with the "entry-level" skills training pro-
grams, ranging from a high $9,984 to a low of $6,943 in their
average 18-month earnings. Equally impressive is the percentage of
individual cases extricating themselves from poverty. The "advanced"
skills training programs. Machine Set-up and Electronics, had 86% of
individual cases exceed corresponding 0MB poverty earnings levels
while the "entry-level " skills training program ranged from 50%
to 75%.
The contrast between the earning power of "advanced" vs. "entry-
level" skills programs is especially poignant when one reviews Table
5. Table 5 clearly demonstrates the disparity of earnings of several
individual cases. Case number 67, for example, cites the earnings of
a participant from Machine Set-up (an "advanced" skill training pro-
gram) at $27,758, while case number 39 earnings from Graphic Arts
(an "entry-level" skill training program) were $6,028: a disparity
of some $21,000. The "advanced" skills training programs obviously
generated 18-month earnings sufficient to transfer the participant
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from poverty to middle-class status while several of the "entry-
level" skills training programs generated income sufficient to
extricate the participant from poverty, but in many cases, insuffi-
cient to transport the participant to middle-class status.
Nonetheless, all programs had instances of participants who
succeeded and participants who failed; for instance, case number 111,
Clerical program, earnings were $20,012; case number 132, Electronic
Bench Assembly, earnings were $22,360; and case number 125, Food
Service, earnings were $15,214; while case number 37, Machine Set-
up, earnings were $1,273.
Nonerthel ess
,
occupational mix data clearly call into question
the wisdom of DOL policy fostering quick "entry-level" skills train-
ing programs for the manpower participant. Data also suggest that
the occupational training chosen by the participant may well deter-
mine later earning power.
Question 4 focuses upon earnings by the demographic character-
istics: age, sex, race, and education. Manpower research suggests
that the earning capacity of the manpower participant may be affected
by demographic characteristics. However, findings were not always
consistent for a given demographic characteristic. Although this
research design did not attempt to weigh or to isolate these char-
acteristics, this study has reviewed earnings by these demographic
characteri sti cs:
Age
At first glance, the earnings by age data is indeed suprising:
the 18-21 age category had the highest 18-month average earnings at
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$13,262, while the 40-49 age category had the lowest average 18-
month earnings at $4,871. Normally, it is expected that new,
young entrants into the labor market will earn less than the mature
worker. However, it must be remembered that the disadvantaged
worker frequently does not have a good work history or good work
skills. Nevertheless, further analysis, detailed in Table 7, re-
vealed several underlying factors possibly causing the phenonenon
of younger workers earning more than older workers: N's were small,
18-21 - N=13 and 40-49 - N=8; 18-21 age category contained two
cases of "advanced" skills training (Machine Set-up) with earnings
of $24,492 and $26,520; and finally, two cases of the 40-49 age
category were totally unemployed with no earnings, while a third
case earned $119.
Both cases training in Machine Set-up were age 21; however,
the critical consideration here is the impact that occupational
choice, i.e., training in advanced skills, had upon the earning
power of these new, young labor force entrants.
Although in this study the N's were indeed small and there-
fore susceptible to fluctuation, occupational choice may also have
been a factor in past programs. Research has been inconsistent in
its findings pertaining to the age, and a possible reason may
be
the impact of occupational choice.
The intermediate years of 22-39 provided no surprises,
earn-
ings hovered around the average earnings of $11,215 for all age
categories; however, 50+ age category earnings of $9,534 were
sub-
stantially below the average for all age categories .
Occupational
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choice and sex may be underlying causative factors. All but one were
females in the 50+ age category.
Sex
Data on sex provide some of the most startling findings in this
research. Manpower research has provided a consensus regarding
superior earning power of the male participant, which obviously is
in concert with the labor market realities. Higher male earnings
would not surprise the researcher or the layman for that matter,
but the vast superiority of male earnings in this research does
give one cause to wonder. Average male 18-month earnings were
$15,438 vs. $8,106 average female 18-month earnings. Males earned
$7,332 more in 18-months than the female, a whopping 87% more.
The natural question is why such a great disparity in earning
power?; the answer may be occupational choice ! Sixty-nine percent
(69%) of the female cases trained in the "entry-level," traditionally
female Clerical occupation. Perhaps the disparity would have been
less dramatic had the Clerical training program included "advanced"
office occupations. The male, on the other hand, dominated the
"advanced" skills training programs (Machine Set-up - 100% and
Electronics - 72%), and, of course, also dominated the other tradi-
tionally male occupations, such as. Machine Shop. In fact, the
Machine Shop program trained 24 participants; 2 were female. Machine
Set-up, Electronics, and Machine Shop were the top three in average
18-month earnings of $22,524, $20,581 , and $14,871, respectively.
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In effect then, only four female cases participated in tradi-
tionally male occupations of Machine Technology and Electronics.
The N's are too small to draw firm conclusions as to potential
earning power that females may expect, had there been greater parti-
cipation of females in traditionally male occupational training
programs. However, case number 97, a female training in Elec-
tronics, earned $23,465 in the 18-month period. In contrast, average
Clerical earnings were $8,426. Participation in the "advanced" male
dominated training program by this female resulted in her surpassing
the average female Clerical trainee by $15,039 in an 18-month period.
This trainee moved from poverty to middle-class economic status in a
short 18 months due to her occupational choice.
There is evidence to suggest that the labor market discriminates
against the female worker by paying the male more; however, data
from this study may seem to suggest that training in traditionally
male occupations may result in higher earnings for the female parti-
ci pant.
Not only did the male participant on the "average" earn nearly
twice that of the female participant, but individually the male
participant also fared better, 80% of the male cases extricated them-
selves from poverty while only 58% of the female cases extricated
themselves from poverty, and often the male moved to middle-class
status while the female remained in and around poverty status.
Occupational choice then may be an underlying factor in econ-
omic status for the female manpower participant. A choice of a
traditionally female "entry-level" occupational training, such as,
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Clerical, may result in little improvement in economic status while
a choice of training in traditionally male occupation, such as.
Machine Set-up, may result in substantial improvement in economic
status
.
Race
Generally, manpower research found that whites earn more than
minorities (e.g., Perry & Mangum). Therefore, initially, it was
somewhat surprising to find that the average 18-month earnings of
the white participant was less than the Black participant ($11,097
vs. $11,771). Equally surprising was the percentage of individual
cases exceeding corresponding 18-month 0MB poverty earnings: Blacks -
75%; Whites - 67%; and Hispanics - 54%.
Further analysis, however, suggests that sex and occupational
choice were the underlying factors causing the average Black parti-
cipant to fare the best. A review of the data shows the white
category with 23 males and 49 females (i.e., females dominated the
white category, 68%), while the Black category was somewhat male
dominated, 24 males and 16 females (i.e., 60% male). Also, the
Black male dominated the Machine Shop training program. Machine
Shop average 18-month earnings were $14,871.
This phenomenon is highlighted by Table 12 revealing that the
white male outstripped earnings of all other race category by an
outstanding margin. The average 18-month earnings of the white male
was in the $18,000 plateau while the minority males were in the
$13,000 range.
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Female 18-month earnings range from a Hispanic low of $7,455
to a Black high of $9,284. Apparently, the white female low earn-
ings ($7,857) dropped the entire white category to the bottom.
Also, the 59/4 of individual white female cases exceeding OMB poverty
levels resulted in the entire white category with a 67% rate as
opposed to the Black percentage of 75%.
Nevertheless, on the average, the white male moved from
poverty to middle-class economic status and 87% of white male
individual cases (the highest percentage for all race categories)
extricated themselves from poverty. Although the majority of
white males fared well in all training programs, the "advanced"
skill training program. Machine Set-up, was dominated by the white
male (5 of 7). Labor market preference for the white male may also
be a factor in the higher white male earnings. In essence, then,
the white male fared the best of all race, sex categories.
Occupational choice may be an underlying factor in the earn-
ing capacities of race. For instance, case number 78, Hispanic
male. Machine Set-up, 18-month earnings were $26,520; case number
29, Black male, Electronics, 18-month earnings were $18,410; and
case number 94, Black male. Electronics, 18-month earnings were
$23,044.
Educati on
Manpower research has a preponderance of evidence demonstrating
that higher education results in higher earnings; however, Goldstein
did point out that several studies found training benefiting the high
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school dropout more than the high school graduate. The dropout in
this study did, in fact, fare better than the high school graduate
for the 9-11 years of education category. However, an underlying
cause may be sex: the high school diploma category has 63% female
participants, while the 9-11 category has only 45% female partici-
pants. Hence, the high school diploma category may have been af-
fected by the lower earning capacity of the female participant.
However, data from this study clearly demonstrate the higher
earning capacity of the 13+ years of education category. In short,
the participant with some college education fared very well: average
18-month earnings of $17,184 and 90% of the individual cases exceeded
corresponding 0MB poverty levels; actually, the 13+ years of education
participant moved to middle-class economic status.
Recommendati ons
Manpower research has been limited, as a rule, to six months
or one year studies primarily due to poor management information
systems and to high subject mobility. Several manpower researchers
have commented upon the dearth of long-term research (e.g., Perry,
1976, Goldstein, 1972, Gay & Borus, 1980). These two salient
factors persist today making it very difficult for researcher to
conduct much needed long-term research. The manpower regulations
themselves do not foster long-term research since they require only
a 90-day follow-up period and this regulation has been interpreted
by DOL as prohibiting the expenditure of CETA funds by program
operators for follow-up research or evaluation activities beyond the
90-day period.
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This researcher encountered similar operational problems:
poor MIS and high subject mobility, making a follow-up study beyond
18-months somewhat problematical. Yet, long-term studies of the
economic impact of CETA manpower programs are essential if Congress
and manpower professionals are to know whether the manpower training
programs have made any sustained impact upon the earning capacity
of the manpower training participant. DOL has the responsibility
to obtain credible research information so that Congress may base
its budget deliberations concerning the employment and training
system upon viable long-term research and evaluation information.
Consequently, it is recommended that:
The Department of Labor should improve the design of its
CETA Management Information so that it will support long-
term manpower research.
Congress should place an emphasis upon long-term economic
impact studies. Study design mix should include an
emphasis upon empirical studies.
Much of the manpower research focused attention upon the
program rather than its component parts, i.e., occupational mix.
Hence, economic impact data focused upon the graduate of the man-
power program rather than a particular occupational component.
Data from this study, however, may suggest that occupational mix
should be considered by manpower researchers. There were vast
differences in the economic impact of occupational program
components imparting advanced skills as opposed to those occupa-
tional program components imparting entry level skills. For
in-
stance, Machine Set-up, an advanced skills occupational
training
program, had 18-month earnings of $22,524, while Food Service, an
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entry level skills occupational training program, had 18-month
earnings of $6,943. It is recommended that:
Manpower research place greater emphasis upon occupational
mix.
The substantial disparity of 18-month earnings and the per-
centage of individual cases exceeding the correspondence 0MB poverty
level between the advanced and entry level skills programs was very
revealing. Not only did the advanced skills training programs re-
sult in substantially higher "average" 18-month earning than did the
entry level skills training programs, but individually, substantially
more participants from the advanced skills training programs extri-
cated themselves from poverty than those of entry level skills
training programs.
This is an important finding since the focus of this study was
to determine whether a vocationally oriented training program pro-
viding cluster skills training including entry, intermediate, and
advanced skills could extricate its training participant from poverty;
for manpower researchers, such as, Mangum and Walsh (1973); and
Goldstein (1972) found that most manpower participants remained in
and around poverty. Clearly, the findings from this research would
indicate that greater emphasis should be placed upon clustered skills
training. It is recommended that:
The Department of Labor should establish a policy
encouraging the development of cluster skills
training with an emphasis upon "advanced" skills
trai ni ng
.
The importance of program choice becomes apparent as one re-
views the data concerning occupational programs, age, and sex. The
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importance of program choice is particularly revealing when one con-
siders the impact that program choice had upon the earnings of sex:
males nearly doubled the earnings of females. Males dominated tradi-
tionally male occupational programs imparting intermediate and advanced
skills while the females dominated a traditionally female entry level
occupational skills training program - clerical. The manpower de-
livery system has a responsibility to insure the opportunity for
income equity by explaining the importance of program choice to parti-
cipants and by implementing affirmative action whenever necessary.
It is recommended that:
The importance of program choice be fully explained
to potential participants, particularly females and
minorities
.
Affirmative action must be taken by manpower admin-
istrators, federal, state, and local, to enroll
females into trad iti onally male "advanced" skills
training programs.
The review of literature revealed that the basic labor inter-
change mission of the Department of Labor conflicts with the manpower
training responsibilities of DOL. The result of this conflict has
been the operational philosophy of DOL to insist upon quick entry
level skills training programs so that the participant could be moved
quickly into the labor force. Mangum believes that DOL sees a job
as the means and end. It is apparent that the manpower delivery
system could benefit from the interaction of the Department of Educa-
tion in the delivery of manpower services. It is recommended that:
Congress increase the involvement of the vocational
educator in the manpower delivery system. The in-
creased involvement should include administrative
and operational responsibilities at the federal,
state, and local levels.
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APPENDIX A
LETTER OF PERMISSION TO CONDUCT THE STUDY FROM THE MAYOR
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS
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City of Springfield
T 1 1 F.ODO K E E . D IMA L'RO
Nlavor
1 1 1 ti 7-7
30 Court Street
Springfield. Ma. 01 103
Septanber 21, 1981
Mr. Raymond A. Jarvis
35 Mallard Circle
Agawam, Massachusetts 01001
Dear Mr. Jarvis:
In response to our recent conversation, I am hereby granting you
authority to conduct research pertinent to our training programs
administered by the Hanpden County Snployment and Training Con-
sortium. You may have access to any and all necessary records.
I wish you well in your endeavor and ask that I may receive a
copy of your final dissertation. Good luck!
Sincerely
Theodore E . Dimauro
Mayor, City of Springfield
TED:rmb
appendix b
OMB POVERTY INCOME LEVELS FISCAL YEARS 1978-82
OMB
Poverty
Income
Levels
Fiscal
Year
1978-82
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